b33 
It is beyond the scope of this paper (nor have I done the necessary 
research) to fully evaluate whether the Soviet leadership has sought 
or managed to impose an overall strategy on these conflicting uses, 
designed to promote some long-range international goal. But it may 
help to see where the navy fits into the broader picture if we consider 
in rather general terms five elements of the problem: (1) the allocation 
of resources, (2) the setting of objectives, (3) organizational struc- 
tures, (4) operational control, and (5) strategic infrastructure. 
THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES 
The allocation of resources goes to the heart of the planning 
process, and to varying degrees the different oceanusers are in direct 
competition with each other for scarce resources. Policy, in the shape 
of decisions between competing claims, has therefore to be made, 
but the question is, on what basis? Ships are metal containers stuffed 
with men and equipment, and there are five main types of competition 
involved. 
First, we have the nationwide competition for investment funds. 
It seems fairly certain that the requirements of the major oceanusers 
are considered under existing categories such as defense, foreign trade, 
and food and agriculture, rather than under a special maritime cate- 
gory. The navy has to compete for funds within the defense budget; 
merchant ship requirements are considered within the general demands 
for domestic and foreign trade, the need to earn foreign exchange, 
and the avoidance of undue dependence on Western bottoms; and 
the fishing industry is viewed in terms of the national requirement 
for protein, and the prospects of the agricultural sector of the econo- 
my. External factors are taken into account, such as the fishing fleet’s 
contribution to the foreign exchange problem, the merchant fleet’s 
capacity to supply the Eastern Front in a war with China and to 
deliver arms and equipment to client states, and the contribution 
by both of them to foreign policy goals. But these are likely to 
be seen as byproducts and do not appear to be the primary determi- 
nants for allocating funds. 
Second, we have the competition for Soviet shipyard capacity. The 
Ministry of Shipbuilding Production already serves the navy, the 
merchant, fishing and river fleets, the border guards, the Academy 
of Sciences’ oceanographic interests, and will probably serve the 
offshore oil industry. Competition for facilities appears to have been 
resolved in large measure by freezing the allocation of yard capacity 
and by a fair degree of type specialization, with certain yards (and 
facilities within yards) being devoted to particular types of production. 
To some extent this is inevitable, given the increasing sophistication 
of warships, the differentiation between all types of ships, the con- 
straints imposed by investment in prefabrication and series production, 
and the very different construction techniques required for different 
types of vessel. There are some adjustments, as for example in South 
Yard, Nikolaev where the large buildingway has been used variously 
for naval construction, fish factory ships and merchant vessels, and 
in other yards unplanned gaps in naval production have been filled 
by civilian construction. However, the increasing yard specialization 
does tend to fix each customer’s share of shipyard facilities on a 
