134 
long-term basis. The last major shift in allocation took place in the 
middle fifties, when 7 of the 13 cruiser/battleship building ways were 
reassigned to civilian construction. A gradual shift in the proportional 
share of facilities has also been occasioned by the building of new 
yards. Of the five major yards which entered production since World 
War II, four were designed for the series construction of merchant 
ships, and only one was assigned to naval construction.'”° The shift 
is however somewhat less than the figures might suggest, since there 
has also been considerable investment in expanding and remodeling 
naval construction facilities, particularly the main nuclear submarine 
building yards. 
Third, we have the demands levied on the economy at large. Ship- 
building is an assembly industry, which reaches into every sector of 
the economy. Different clients will have different requirements, large 
bulk carriers placing heavy demands for steel, while naval construction 
competes at the high technology end of the economy. Nevertheless, 
there remains a considerable overlap, in the nature of these demands, 
and it wasn’t for nothing that Khrushchev castigated the navy as 
‘‘metal eaters.”” Raymond Hutchings has made an interesting survey 
of the opportunity costs of the resources used in naval construction.!?! 
Fourth, we have foreign exchange. Russia has for a long time bought 
a substantial proportion of her nonnaval tonnage abroad. A large 
part of these orders are placed with Warsaw Pact countries and Fin- 
land, but a fair number of fishing vessels (including fish factory ships) 
have been built in Western and Japanese yards. We do not know 
the grounds on which it is decided to order ships abroad, and whether 
it is balanced against the currency costs which would otherwise be 
incurred, but this practice obviously has an effect on other claims 
for foreign exchange and on reducing the ocean users’ claims on 
the domestic economy. The shipbuilding industry now earns a certain 
amount of foreign exchange on its own account, although mainly 
with the Warsaw Pact and client states. 
Fifth, we have the competition for manpower. Here again the con- 
flict lies more with different sectors of the economy, than between 
oceanusers. The days when the Newfoundland Banks trained men 
for the Royal Navy are long past. Although all sailors share a common 
mistress whom they must respect and learn to handle, their daily 
occupations are very different. A large part of the fisherman’s time 
is spent gutting, the merchant seaman has long periods of relative 
inactivity, while Gorshkov’s ‘‘navyman”’ is required to be a technically- 
oriented operator of sophisticated equipment. There is of course much 
greater overlap in the engine room and on the bridge between the 
merchant, fishing and oceanographic units, but it is not clear that 
these categories are in short supply within the Soviet Union. Service 
at sea provides the average man the rare opportunity to see the 
world outside Russia. 
'20Ship Systems Command, U.S. Department of the Navy, Soviet Shipbuilding, December 1969, 
Figure 1. 
1R. Hutchings, ““The Economic Burden of the Soviet Navy,’ Soviet Naval Developments, pp. 
210-22. 
