13)5) 
THE SETTING OF OBJECTIVES 
Looking back at the evolution of the main oceanusing organizations 
in the postwar period, one has the strong impression that in the 
past, each has marched to its own drum. Shifts in Soviet naval policy 
have reflected changes in perception of the strategic threat to the 
Soviet homeland. Investment in the fishing industry began shortly after 
the war and was prompted by economic studies, showing that it cost 
twice as much to produce one ton of beef as it did to produce 
one ton of fish.!22 The buildup of the Soviet merchant fleet began 
in the middle fifties, reflecting wider policy changes in the wake 
of Stalin’s death. The Soviet Union increased the scope and intensity 
of her foreign economic activities,'?? and there was a move towards 
cultivating Third World support with trade, aid, and arms supply. 
Fishery operations extended to exploit existing fisheries and open 
up new ones. The Merchant Fleet’s importance as a foreign currency 
earner/saver increased over the years and, to make economic use 
of their ships, Soviet shipping companies had to engage in cross- 
trading, joining the appropriate liner conferences in the process. Both 
fleets (or industries) were under increasing pressure to operate on 
a commercial basis, and were required to develop their own invest- 
ment funds from internal profits. Meanwhile, on the Soviets’ own 
admission, the decision that the navy should move forward in strategic 
defense was prompted by the new threat of nuclear strikes against 
Russia from distant sea areas. The protection which this naval 
presence might afford to merchant vessels and fishing fleets was a 
bonus, and it was not even mentioned by the navy prior to 1967. 
Further evidence that in the past, at least, Russian ocean-users have 
not worked to a common strategy, is provided by the development 
of their respective positions on the law of the sea. William Butler 
has pointed to the conflict between naval and fisheries’ interests, 
during the fifties and early sixties, and how slow the navy was to 
adjust its position so as to match the new operational posture which 
had recently been adopted.!*4 
There is also the fragmentation of oceanographic research, vessels 
working primarily in support of their parent organization. Thus fish- 
eries research vessels (and Submarines) evaluate new fishery grounds; 
vessels coming under the Academy of Sciences pursue more funda- 
mental research; and naval hydrographic units are defense directed. 
There is obviously a considerably overlap of interests and it would 
appear that results are collated centrally, and of course the work 
of Academy of Science units is closely related to the navy’s concerns. 
Nevertheless, the separate subordinations persist and how well the 
programs are coordinated is not clear. 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Distant-water fishing fleets are under the command of a commodore 
and the fleet’s internal structure follows naval lines. This appears 
122R_T. Ackley ‘“‘The Fishing Fleet and Soviet Strategy,’’ United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 
July 1975, p. 3. 
23R_ Athay “Perspectives on Soviet Merchant Shipping Policy”, Soviet Naval Developments, p. 94. 
124W_ Butler, “The Legal Dimensions of Soviet Maritime Policy,’ Soviet Naval Developments, pp. 
118-119. 
