N37 
STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
The spread of Soviet trading and fishery interests has created a 
growing influence-structure of Soviet consular and trade officials, of 
fishery plant and port installation advisers, and even a harbor master. 
The Russians have helped to build new merchant and fishing port 
facilities and to develop local fishing industries. The Soviet Navy 
has also been developing base facilities of various kinds in Cuba, 
Egypt, Syria, Somalia, and apparently hopes to gain access to western- 
most Africa. 
Does this process follow any coordinated pattern? Do we see an 
initial penetration by the merchant fleet, expanded by the fisheries 
people and finally exploited by the navy? On rather limited evidence 
I would answer no. Each organization appears to pursue its own 
special interests. The navy seems to have clear geostrategic require- 
ments and has zeroed in on these. The cases of Egypt,!2° Somalia,'”° 
and (as yet unsuccessful) West Africa!?” provide good examples of 
how strongly focused these requirements are. The fishing fleets have 
a different set of requirements related to the whereabouts of fish, 
and they need access to local ports for fresh supplies, to carry out 
repairs in sheltered waters, and to be able to ferry crews in and 
out by air. The merchant fleet meanwhile follows the dictates of 
policy concerning trade, aid, and arms supply. The price of access 
to naval base facilities will normally include the supply of arms and 
perhaps aid in the form of fisheries development. The three will there- 
fore frequently coincide, but not in the expected chronological order. 
Meanwhile, in strategic terms the value of this infrastructure de- 
pends entirely on the political alinement of the governments in power. 
We are a long way from the days of Western imperial expansion, 
when European powers moved in to administer directly new colonial 
territories, or established trading posts and bases as sovereign enclaves 
possessing a punitive capability. Nowadays, the fact of building a 
port provides absolutely no guarantee that one will be able to make 
use of it in the future. 
POLICIES TOWARDS OCEAN USE 
If we look at the behavior of Soviet ocean-users as a manifestation 
of underlying policy, we notice two separate tendencies. On the one 
hand each user is more or less organized along military lines; each 
comprises a more or less disciplined body of men and women; in 
each case operational control rests either with the respective ministry 
in Moscow, or with subordinate agencies such as the naval fleet 
headquarters, the merchant shipping lines, and the fishing fleet 
headquarters; and finally, all ships, military or civilian, must report 
their position and intended movements daily. Because of this central- 
ized structure and the maintenance of a worldwide shipping plot, 
it is easy for Moscow to take full operational control of all Soviet- 
flag vessels in time of crisis and to divert individual ships for special 
purposes. 
5See G. S. Dragnich ‘“‘The Soviet Union’s quest for access to naval facilities in Egypt prior to the 
June War of 1967,” Soviet Naval Policy, pp. 237-77. 
"6“The Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployment in the Indian Ocean, 1968-71", Soviet Naval 
Developments, pp. 425-30. 
"7“The Evolution of Soviet Naval Policy: 1960-74," Soviet Naval Policy, pp. 525, 528. 
