138 
On the other hand, each ocean-user has his own distinct set of 
short- and long-term objectives which only overlap with the others 
at the periphery. These different objectives have evolved through quite 
different processes, at quite different times, to meet quite different 
needs. They give no evidence of being the result of some master 
plan. In strategic as well as in tactical terms, each user appears to 
operate his fleet (conduct his business) so as to serve his own particu- 
lar purposes. Meanwhile, ocean users are in competition with each 
other for national resources in several sectors of the economy. And 
while we can not be certain how allocations are decided, the long- 
term type-specialization of shipyard facilities suggest an intrabu- 
reaucracy bargain rather than a flexible master plan. 
If, then, Russia has not been working to some long-range plan 
in the past, it might be useful to ask whether she in fact needs 
a tightly coordinated oceans policy. And also to consider why it is 
so often assumed in the West that a master strategy exists. 
Russia’s immediate interest in ocean resources predominantly in- 
volves fisheries and most of these lie within 200 miles of the world’s 
coastlines. Her interests in nonliving resources are mainly related to 
oil and gas on her own continental shelf which, under the 1958 
convention, is considered a “natural prolongation of national terri- 
tory,” and as such is not really part of a worldwide oceans’ policy. 
Her interest in the resources of the ‘‘deep seabed and ocean floor 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” is tempered by the untapped 
resources of these minerals within her own borders, and the heavy 
investment and high technology required for seabed exploitation. She 
does, however, insist on being a party to any international arrange- 
ments for allocating these resources, although her concern that the 
high-technology Western nations should not monopolize the benefits, 
clashes with her traditional resistance to delegating executive power 
to international authorities. 
The fishing industry which is an internal domestic interest, wishes 
to operate as close to foreign shores as possible, and is opposed 
to national jurisdictions being extended beyond the 12-mile Territorial 
Sea. The interests of the ocean science community lie in the same 
direction. This clashes with Russia’s foreign policy objective of increas- 
ing the Soviet Union’s prestige and influence among the nations of 
the developing world, since the latter are strongly committed to the 
concept of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. 
Turning from resources to using the sea for navigation, the navy’s 
interests lie with the fishing industry’s in opposing extended national 
jurisdiction, but its primary concern is to insure free transit through 
key international straits. This clashes with the interests of various 
Third World states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Morocco. In 
contrast, the merchant fleet is not vitally concerned about the effects 
of extended jurisdiction nor about a more critical interpretation of 
“innocent passage”; it comprises modern but rather traditional ships, 
with few of the giant tankers which worry coastal states. 
In establishing her position on Law of the Sea, the Soviet Union 
has had to balance out these four types of national interest: Domestic, 
defense, foreign trade, and foreign policy. This done, there is a new 
framework within which the separate interests can be pursued. Apart 
from this, it is not at all clear that an ‘‘oceans policy” as a separate 
