iis) S) 
component of national policy is necessary, or indeed feasible. As 
we have seen, interests in ocean use are extensions of those on land, 
although complicated by the international nature of the operating 
environment. Distant-water fisheries serve domestic food and agricul- 
ture interests and/or foreign trade; naval deployments serve the 
defense of the homeland and/or foreign policy interests merchant fleet 
operations serve foreign and/or foreign policy interests. There are 
policies concerning these four national interests and and in every 
case the ““ocean component” is only one of many. 
When Western commentators talk about the existence of a master 
strategy and the central coordination of all ocean activities, they are 
in fact usually referring only to foreign policy interests and the pursuit 
of international goals. The implication is that the other three interests 
are to a greater or less extent subordinated to the requirements of 
an expansionist foreign policy. However, the evidence of the Law 
of the Sea negotiations would argue otherwise. Russia had a great 
deal to gain by siding with the Group of 77 in these negotiations; 
she would have highlighted the intransigence of the ‘traditional 
maritime powers’ and other capitalist states, and she would have 
outflanked China in its bid for Third World influence. Instead, her 
outspoken opposition to the sweeping changes proposed to the existing 
ocean regime, with its emphasis on freedom of the high seas and 
narrow territorial waters, put her squarely in the opposing camp. 
She was coupled with Japan, who like Russia, had invested heavily 
in expeditionary fishing fleets, as the most intransigent opponent to 
the economic zone; and linked with the United States and Britain 
in her insistence on free transit through straits. In other words, defense 
of the homeland, and the domestic interests of food and agriculture, 
took precedence over foreign policy goals. Only when she found her- 
self completely isolated did Russia grudgingly adjust her position on 
the economic zone, and we have yet to see what she will do about 
the straits issue. 
Western insistence on the existence of a Soviet master plan stems 
from several sources. In large part it is prompted by the organizational 
structure of their civilian fleets, by the centralized operational control, 
and by the demonstrated capacity to exercise that control when 
required. It is reinforced by mistaken assumptions about Russia’s na- 
tional objectives, which ignore the dominance of domestic factors 
in policy formulation, which underrate the concern to provide an 
active defense of the homeland against a clearly perceived threat, 
and which, in the field of foreign policy, overlooks the priority given 
to the avoidance of general war with the West. It is based on poorly 
understood memories of the Pax Britannica and echoes of Mahan’s 
historical theories. It reflects the sea’s vital importance to the Western 
alliance, and a sense of worried resentment over growing Soviet in- 
fringement of the West’s maritime monopoly. 
THE SEA IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 
While it is incorrect to claim that foreign policy objectives deter- 
mine Soviet oceans policy, it is true to say that Russia makes extensive 
use of the sea in support of Soviet foreign policy. 
