140 
The importance of the sea lies in the access it provides to non- 
adjacent areas, and Soviet foreign policy has exploited that access 
mainly with her merchant fleet. The shift of resources to merchant 
construction coincided with the general reorientation of foreign policy 
toward the Third World in 1955. Soviet-flag ships with their well- 
disciplined crews enhance the nation’s prestige and influence, particu- 
larly when they make well-publicized deliveries of aid. Soviet tankers 
insure the supply of countries like Cuba or North Vietnam, Soviet 
merchant ships deliver arms, equipment and logistic support to client 
states; certain classes were specially designed with large hatches and 
heavy derricks to permit the shipment of heavy or bulky types of 
equipment to countries with inadequate port facilities. Meanwhile the 
Soviet flag can be seen in most countries of the world, and a merchant 
ship is still just a merchant ship, irrespective of its cargo. It has 
none of the political overtones inherent in a naval unit, with its 
warlike armament and special sovereign status. The merchant fleet 
is still primarily involved in trade and the business of earning foreign 
currency. But it plays an important role as an instrument of foreign 
policy. 
The presence in distant waters of the fishing fleet, ocean research 
vessels and space-related support ships is also exploited for political 
purposes, although to a much lesser extent. Visits by space ships 
foster the impression of a leading technological power. Naval hydro- 
graphic units provide a professional presence in civilian garb. And 
the fishing fleets’ requirement for local support facilities generates 
considerable income ashore, although this potential influence may be 
cancelled out by anger at Soviet fishing operations. The fishing indus- 
try, however, makes its greatest contribution to foreign policy objec- 
tives (and foreign exchange) by the development of indigenous fishery 
capabilities, and the provision of aid in the form of harbor develop- 
ment, fishery handling and processing facilities, and management and 
technical assistance. 
The navy is also used to further foreign policy objectives, and 
all foreign port visits will have some form of local impact. Anne 
Kelly concludes that about 80 percent of these visits are to meet 
the ships’ operational requirements (fresh provisions, rest and recrea- 
tion, and sometimes fuel), but that the other 20 percent are made 
for overt diplomatic purposes.'8 The pattern of Soviet behavior is 
carefully controlled; in Third World countries the influence target 
is the local political and military elites, and in the case of client 
states, there is direct contact with the national leadership. 
The number of port visits rose sharply in 1968, and since 1971 
naval forces have been used for special operations in direct support 
of Soviet foreign policy. These have been described in sections I 
and II of this chapter and divide into two main categories; reactions 
to U.S. initiatives (i.e., ““countering imperialist aggression”) and opera- 
tions intended to ‘‘increase Soviet prestige and influence”. The latter 
range from minesweeping and port-clearing operations, to providing 
the diplomatic support of a Soviet naval presence to influence the 
outcome of events affecting a client state. 
128 AM. Kelly ‘‘Port Visits and the ‘Internationalist Mission’ of the Soviet Navy", Soviet Naval In- 
fluence: domestic and foreign dimensions, Praegers, forthcoming. 
