141 
While the presence of Soviet naval units and fishing fleets in distant 
waters is exploited for political purposes, the requirement for shore 
facilities to support both types of operation, itself acts as a determinant 
of Soviet foreign policy, moving the latter in directions which it might 
otherwise not have taken, and into geographical areas which are not 
of primary political interest. In particular, the navy’s requirement for 
access to base facilities may conflict with the wider objective of in- 
creasing Soviet influence in the world. Mohamed Heikal has described 
the Egyptian reaction to Soviet base requirements in 1967, when 
Nasser retorted “This is just imperialism’, to Podgorny’s full de- 
mands. !29 
Reviewing the role of the sea in Soviet foreign policy, there are 
four points to bear in mind. First, in order to use the sea the way 
she does, Russia has to rely on maritime stability and the freedom 
of the seas. She does not have the forces (no country has) to provide 
protection for her merchant ships and fishing fleets around the world, 
and it is not in her interests to encourage the breakdown of maritime 
law and order. 
Second, in 1954 the Soviet Union shifted resources from naval 
to civilian ship construction, a significant indication of the priority 
attached to different interests in the use of the sea. These cuts have 
never been restored and in terms of assembly capacity, subsequent 
capital construction has continued to favor the civilian over the naval 
sector of the shipbuilding industry. 
Third, the sea is nowadays not the only means of providing physical 
access to distant parts. Although it remains the most economical (and 
only practical) means of shipping vast quantities of goods and people 
over long distances for sustained periods, and the only method of 
transporting really heavy and bulky objects, there have been tremen- 
dous advances in aircraft range and payload. This now allows the 
rapid supply of relatively large and heavy items, including major types 
of combat equipment, to most parts of the world. 
And fourth, there is a very wide range of foreign policy instruments 
available to the Soviet Union. Access, although essential, is secondary. 
The first question concerns the most appropriate type of instrument 
to be used in the particular circumstances: diplomatic, political, 
economic, cultural, subversive or military. That decided, one can then 
select the best way of applying it, and in many cases, maritime 
methods will be only one of several alternatives. 
SEAPOWER AND FOREIGN POLICY 
Gorshkov gives no indication that a Soviet oceans policy exists,'*° 
but he does talk about seapower. On the one hand, he claims that 
the Soviet Union is constantly strengthening her seapower (73/2/18/2: 
128/1/4); and on the other, he complains that the Soviet Union lacks 
129M. Heikal, ‘‘Road to Ramadan,” op. cit., pp. 47-48. See also pp. 166-67 on this general issue of 
the negative effects of a Soviet military presence. 
'30The chapter ‘““Some Problems in Mastering the World Ocean” makes a reference to the CPSU 
program calling for ‘‘not only the utilization of known resources, but also prospecting for new ones” 
and goes on to say that the World Ocean is becoming extremely important in this respect in view of 
its potential to support the ‘“‘economic might" of the Soviet Union. The author claims that a great 
deal of attention was paid to this subject at the 24th Party Congress and offers a truncated quotation 
from Brezhnev’s opening report in support (73/2/15/2: 125/1/2). The full statement in fact refers to a 
general willingness to cooperate internationally in almost every kind of activity, including for exam- 
ple, energy, transportation, public health, and outer space (24th Congress of the CPSU, Novosti, 
Moscow 1971, p. 38). Doubts about the authorship of this chapter are discussed in the sub-section 
“Ocean Resources and the Law of the Sea”’ in Section III of this chapter. 
