142 
any coherent policy for the development and exploitation of sea 
power.'3! However, when we read the rather brief passage he devotes 
to discussing seapower, we see that he treats the other components 
perfunctorily and does not explain what contribution the merchants 
and fishing fleets make to this concept (73/2/18-19: 128/2). He starts 
the discussion by linking the need to strengthen Soviet seapower with 
the requirement to strengthen the country’s defense from the sea 
(18/2: 128/1/4), and ends it by saying that the most important com- 
ponent of sea power is the navy, ‘“‘whose mission is to secure state 
interests on the seas and the oceans and to defend the country from 
possible attacks from the direction of the seas and the oceans” 
(18/8:128/2/4). To all intents and purposes, Gorshkov equates sea 
power with naval forces, and it is the navy which he sees as a poten- 
tially powerful instrument of state policy in peacetime. c 
Even on the basis of Gorshkov’s own comments,'*? it would appear 
that not everybody in Moscow attaches the same degree of importance 
as he does to the role of naval forces as an instrument of peacetime 
foreign policy. It is true that the use of naval units in this way 
has increased since 1971, reflecting the decision to place an increased 
emphasis on the role of a Soviet military presence. But as discussed 
in Section II, it is not clear whether this policy was modified in 
the wake of the withdrawal from Egypt. For instance, ship/days on 
distant deployment levelled off after 1971, and the use of naval forces 
for specifically political purposes levelled off in 1972-73. Meanwhile, 
since 1973 we have the appearance in combat zones of military per- 
sonnel from “‘revolutionary”” countries such as Cuba, Vietnam, and 
North Korea. They man Soviet weapons and equipment, and the Soviet 
Union’s strategic logistic capability brings them to the combat zone 
and supplies them in action. This may well reflect an adaptation 
of the original policy, which avoids being charged with imperialism 
and reduces the risk of confrontation. 
There would also be the question of the diplomatic effectiveness 
of naval forces. For example, did the reactive deployment of a Soviet 
detachment during the Indo/Pakistan war in December 1971 actually 
achieve anything? Was the force authorized to attack the U.S. carrier 
group if it had launched its strike aircraft (target unknown), and 
who would have come out best from the encounter? Did the deploy- 
ment merely highlight the relative impotence of counterforces in these 
circumstances? Similarly, what purpose was served by rushing a force 
to the South China Sea in response to the mining of Haiphong in 
May 1972, which just hung around for a few days and then returned 
home? 
In the final analysis, the question of effectiveness must depend 
on Russia’s readiness to use force if need be. We lack the evidence 
to make a firm judgment on this, except to note that Soviet policy 
has so far tended to be cautious, she has adopted an incremental 
approach to new initiatives, testing Western reactions before proceed- 
'8'See the sub-section ‘““The Need for Naval Policy” in Section III of this chapter. 
‘32 In a series of comments which are generally believed to have contemporary relevance, Gorshkov 
criticizes those who failed to understand the importance to Russia of having a strong navy: Tsarists 
(72/3/20/3, 21/1; 72/4/9/1, 22/9: 11/2/2, 12/1/6, 25/1/1, 36/1/2) and Fools (72/3/20/2-21/1: 11-12). 
