143 
ing, and in times of crisis has behaved with great circumspection. 
However, it must all depend on the type of interests at stake. We 
have ample evidence that the Soviet Union reacts vigorously to a 
preceived threat to the security of the homeland, reactions which 
have ranged from the military occupation of Czechoslovakia to the 
investment of vast resources in trying to provide antimissile defense 
or develop a counter to Polaris. But it does not seem that the Soviet 
Union attaches the same type of urgent commitment to her long- 
range international goals. After all, the inexorable processes of history 
are on her side and she can afford to win some, lose some. Meanwhile, 
direct confrontation with the United States. inevitably carries some 
risk of escalation to nuclear war, particularly if high-value units like 
carriers are involved. 
It therefore seems unlikely that all of Gorshkov’s claims concerning 
the role of the navy in peacetime have been accepted. Nevertheless, 
naval forces do have a wide range of capabilities and will doubtless 
be used accordingly for political purposes. Their ‘“‘main mission” of 
defending Russia from attacks from the sea will, however, continue 
to have priority. Two points remain unclear. First, whether the Soviets 
are prepared to allocate shipbuilding resources to support a political 
role, over and above what is required for the war-related missions. 
And second, whether they are willing to apply naval force to achieve 
less than vital objectives. Meanwhile, the Angolan affair illustrates 
how well served Soviet policy is by her merchant fleet and airlift 
capability. Limited naval forces were, however, deployed to the area 
and lent the authority of a “Soviet military presence’’.!°3 
FUTURE PROSPECTS 
The most significant aspect of Gorshkov’s articles is that they were 
written at all. Their publication provides an insight to the major debate 
which from other evidence we know was in progress between 1969 
and 1973, and which in the military field extended and expanded 
the debate which had been underway since 1960. The articles advance 
a powerful argument for the importance of the navy’s role in war 
and as an instrument of state policy in peacetime. But they are 
primarily an exercise in advocacy, a polemic, and although we can 
obtain a reasonably clear understanding of what Gorshkov actually 
said, when it comes to what his policy preferences were in 1971-72, 
we can only be certain of two. First, he considered that the Soviet 
Union had an unbalanced fleet, which was deficient in surface ships, 
both as to numbers and the range of types, and that the navy had 
been shaped too closely to a single, restrictive, and largely defensive 
mission. And second, he strongly opposed any weakening of Russia’s 
position in the Eastern Mediterranean, either by withdrawing Soviet 
'831t is too early to assess the Soviet Navy’s contribution to this operation, since we lack informa- 
tion of U.S. naval movements. The landing ship which normally patrols off Guinea, moved down to 
Pointe Noire, Congo, and a SAM Kotlin destroyer took up position to the north of Angola, accom- 
panied by an oiler. A Kresta-class missile cruiser deployed from the Mediterranean and took up sta- 
tion to the south of Guinea, where it was in a position to cover the North Atlantic approaches to An- 
gola; on the basis of established practice one can assume that she had one or more missile-armed 
submarines in company. Drawing on the pattern of behavior in the Mediterranean, the landing ship 
may have been standing by in case of need, to evacuate key Soviet personnel and special-value 
equipment, with the Kotlin having operational control and available to provide combatant support if 
necessary. The Kresta deployment could have been to serve notice on the United States that Soviet 
interests were committed. 
