144 
forces from Egypt, which would imperil the navy’s access to her 
ports and airfields, or through some kind of mutual agreement with 
the United States. We can also infer that he was averse to any modifi- 
cation of the Soviet position on Law of the Sea which would result 
in restrictions on passage through international straits. 
But his primary concern lay with the structure of the fleet, the 
pressing need to balance the submarine force with sufficient surface 
ships of different specialized types, and the need to develop a general- 
purpose capability. Gorshkov was not seeking to challenge the West 
for maritime supremacy, but his ships did need to have the capability 
of operating in a hostile maritime environment, worldwide, and of 
establishing limited local command in distant sea areas. He blamed 
these deficiencies on the lack of any coherent policy concerning the 
role of seapower in Soviet naval plans. And for all practical purposes, 
Gorshkov equates seapower with naval forces, and the ability to pro- 
ject an effective worldwide naval presence. 
Casting his mind back over the 15 years since he became com- 
mander-in-chief, Gorshkov had good reason to complain about the 
lack of any consistent naval policy. He took over the fleet when 
the threat of assault from the sea had just been downgraded, and 
the annual tonnage of warship new-construction had been slashed 
by 60 percent or more, so as to release resources to the civilian 
economy. Within 5 years, developments in U.S. naval technology had 
engendered a complete reappraisal of the threat, causing the cancella- 
tion of the newly revised programs, and a major shift of naval 
resources into nuclear submarines. Within another 5 years, there were 
two major reevaluations of Russia’s strategic posture vis-a-vis America, 
the second of which forced a radical restructuring of the navy and 
the development of completely new operational concepts. 
On each of these three occasions, the new policy approved by 
the army-dominated leadership involved a sharply focused response 
to the specific threat, with forces tailored to the defense of the home- 
land in the context of general war.'%* And on each occasion, the 
concept of a strong, balanced fleet, capable of adjusting to changing 
circumstances, was rejected. The third change of policy required the 
navy to move forward into a hostile maritime environment, dominated 
by the West, which had recently endorsed a policy of responding 
to Russian initiatives on land by seizing their assets at sea. The Soviet 
fleet had been designed to operate within the range of shore-based 
air cover, it lacked afloat support and forward bases, and its supply 
lines could easily be cut. After a long argument, new surface ship 
construction to support this forward deployment was grudgingly con- 
ceded, but only at the expense of other naval programs and a further 
loss of operational flexibility. 
Brezhnev’s accession to power first brought a hardening of policy 
towards the United States, demanding a more assertive posture at 
sea, and then a move toward detente, with a corresponding increase 
in the political use of naval forces. But naval procurement remained 
wholly determined by a narrowly perceived conception of nuclear- 
missile war, with the other services beginning to play an increasing 
'4See “The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy”, Soviet Naval Developments, pp. 176-209. 
Also “Soviet Naval Capabilities and Intentions’’, and ‘Soviet Naval Procurement’’, The Soviet Union 
in Europe and the Near East, Royal United Service Institution, London, 1970, pp. 33-51, 74-87. 
