145 
part in the navy’s main mission. Meanwhile, lacking a balanced fleet 
and adequate afloat support, the navy’s operational effectiveness de- 
pended heavily on the availability of ports and airfields in the forward 
Operating areas. And this in turn depended on the willingness of 
the Soviet leadership to incur the necessary political costs and risks. 
But it had already backed down from a confrontation with the United 
States over establishing a base in Cuba in 1970. And now, having 
finally gained access to Egyptian facilities, and having developed some 
capability to counter U.S. sea-based delivery systems in the strategi- 
cally vital Eastern Mediterranean, the navy was in danger of losing 
these essential facilities, due to a reversal of recently established policy 
concerning the role of a Soviet military presence in the pursuit of 
international goals. No wonder Gorshkov quoted Lenin on the need 
for “firmness and purposefulness in the carrying out of intended 
plans”’. 
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1972 
What changes have occurred since Gorshkov wrote his final article 
in late 1972, and have any of his ideas been accepted? In the main 
we lack the hindsight to make firm judgments, but there are certain 
straws of evidence. 
THE WAR-RELATED ROLES 
The tasks of conducting strikes against enemy territory and of de- 
fending Russia against similar: strikes by Western sea-based systems, 
still comprises the navy’s main mission.!*° It seems possible that for 
operational purposes, the SSBN force now forms part of the Strategic 
Rocket Forces,!°* more in the way that Tactical Air is operationally 
subordinate to the Ground Forces than the organic subordination of 
the fighter wings to Air Defense (PVO). 
Trident will double the range of the Polaris/Poseidon systems, hence 
(to quote a recent article by Gorshkov), “‘the front of operations 
will be expanded accordingly . . . (and) the corresponding growth 
in the spatial dimension of operations against naval strategic nuclear 
weapons systems is also quite clear’’.!37 Many types of weapon and 
sensor system will join in “‘the battle against strategic nuclear weapon 
platforms’, including those from other branches of service.'** The 
problems of coordination are complex, and the need to discharge 
the task “‘in the shortest possible time’’, achieving operational surprise 
if possible, requires the employment of automated equipment to ensure 
effective command and control.!*9 
Gorshkov explains that the ever-growing scope of war at sea entails 
the increased involvement of the other branches of the armed forces, 
which “foreordains the emergence of a strategy of warfare in the 
oceanic theatres within the framework of a single military strategy’’.'*° 
'85§$._G. Gorshkov “Soviet National Sea Power”’, Pravda, July 28, 1974. For full quotation see Ap- 
pendix C, note 9. 
'86See note 40. This might also be inferred from the relatively few references to strategic strike in 
the Gorshkov series. See Section III—‘‘The Navy’s Wartime Task”’. 
'37§_ G. Gorshkov ‘“‘The Development of the Art of Naval Warfare’’, United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings, June 1975, translated and reprinted from Morskoj sbornik No. 12, 1974, p. 56/1/34. 
‘8 Ibid., pp. 59/2/6, 60/1/1. 
139 Ibid., pp. 59/2/6, 60/1/6, 61/2/4. 
140 [bid., p. 65/2/1. 
