146 
Destroying the enemy’s naval forces still comes within the navy’s 
mission,'*! but the focus of Gorshkov’s exposition is on the two pri- 
mary tasks and he is talking of war-fighting with nuclear weapons 
at sea. His conclusion that tactical and strategic time-scales are now 
equally urgent does not suggest the concept of protracted war at 
sea. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE FLEET 
Since July 1974 at least, surface forces have appeared above naval 
aviation in the protocol-conscious listings of the naval arms of serv- 
ice.'42 We will have to wait to see whether this implies that Gorsh- 
kov’s argument for more surface ships has been heeded (and if so, 
to what extent), or whether naval aviation has been demoted.'* As 
a further indication of the importance of antisubmarine warfare, the 
“forces and means of antisubmarine defense” appeared as an addition 
to the usual five naval arms of service, in a fairly standard listing.'* 
THE STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
In 1973, Admiral Sergeev, Chief of Naval Staff, was asked by a 
Western naval attache what his greatest problem was as the result 
of the shift to forward deployment. He replied without hesitation: 
““Bases’’. 
The need for bases in non-Bloc countries (and the reversal of 
long-standing policy which this implied), seems to have been 
acknowledged by the middle sixties and debate will have centered 
on the political-cost-side of the cost/benefit equation. Notwithstanding 
Gorshkov’s arguments, the Soviet Union withdrew her Air Defense 
units from Egypt in July 1972, and Soviet naval aircraft lost the 
use of those airfields. The Russians managed to persuade President 
Sadat to honor the 5-year agreement on naval base facilities, which 
had been signed by Nasser in March 1968. However, the price for 
renewing that agreement in 1973, appears to have been the signing 
of a new arms supply agreement, which provided the means for 
Egypt’s attack on Israel in October that year. But despite this Russian 
bribe, by April 1974 Egypt was once more reviewing the question 
of foreign access to her facilities, and during 1975 she imposed restric- 
tions on the Soviet use of her ports and anchorages.'**® The portents 
had, however, been clear enough, and from the end of the October 
war, Soviet naval units had begun to make increasing use of Syrian 
ports, and after April 1974 the navy stepped up its search for alterna- 
tive facilities in the Mediterranean.!*” 
'41See note 135 above. 
142 USNIPs, 6/75, 61/1/3-4. 
143.V_ Kasatanov ‘‘Na Strazh Otechestv’’, Krasnaya zvezda, July 28, 1974. In his 1973 Navy Day ar- 
ticle Kasatanov manages to avoid giving any listing, but does link surface ships with submarines 
without including air (ibid., July 29, 1973). 
'441t might just reflect the demotion of Naval Air, without any increased resources being allocated 
to surface ships. The former could be due to the increased use of space systems, and (after losing the 
use of Egyptian airfields) a decision to reduce reliance on the shore-based air component of the anti- 
submarine effort. 
45 “Okeanskij Raketonosnij’’, Krasnaya zvezda, July 28, 1974. 
'46G_§. Dragnich ‘‘The Soviet Union’s quest for access to naval facilities in Egypt prior to the June 
war of 1967,"’ Soviet Naval Policy, pp. 269-70, postscript. 
47 A. Kelly, op.cit. 
