147 
In the Caribbean, substantial facilities had already been provided 
to Cienfuegos, before development of the nuclear submarine base 
was halted in response to U.S. objections. However, it really only 
needed the deployment of a submarine tender for these facilities to 
be activated.'#® Soviet naval units, including submarines, continued 
to visit Cuba, and there appears to have been a deliberate policy 
of probing U.S. reactions to visits by nuclear-powered and/or missile- 
armed submarines. Meanwhile, Cuban airfields are used extensively 
by Soviet aircraft flying reconnaisance. On the other side of the Atlan- 
tic there has, however, been no success in establishing comparable 
arrangements with a West African state, although Soviet maritime 
patrol aircraft do make regular use of the airfield at Conakry in 
Guinea, and it is also used to stage transport aircraft flying from 
Russia to Cuba and to states in Southern Africa. 
In the Indian Ocean area, a base was already under development 
at Berbera in 1973 and by 1976 was nearly complete. It comprised 
an extensive self-contained area with communication facilities, accom- 
modation blocks, and buildings reported to be used for missile test 
and storage; certain areas were restricted to Soviet use. There is 
a tank farm in the vicinity and a large jet airfield and a naval storage 
area are under construction; two other missile base/ports are also 
reported to be under construction in Somalia.'*9 
Which brings us to another aspect of strategic infrastructure which 
needs consideration. The supply of arms and military training is used 
to build up Soviet political influence. But it has also played a role 
in “thwarting the imperialists’ aggressive designs’’ by increasing the 
military strength of Third World countries, thus raising the costs of 
Western military intervention.'°° In certain cases the supply of naval 
arms served Soviet interests yet more directly by diverting Western 
forces from their primary (anti-Russian) assignments. For example, 
the delivery of ocean-going submarines to Egypt in 1957-58 introduced 
a complicating factor to Sixth Fleet operations in the Eastern Mediter- 
ranean. And the buildup in the Indonesian Navy in 1959-60, including 
the supply of bombers armed with antiship missiles, had the effect 
of drawing a large number of British forces east of Suez, including 
the attack carriers nominally assigned to SACLANT. More interesting 
still was the shift of Soviet attention back to the Mediterranean in 
the early sixties at the time of the navy’s move forward in strategic 
defense. Egypt’s submarine force was upgraded with second-generation 
units and she also was given missile-armed bombers, thus posing a 
direct threat to the Sixth Fleet. And at the other end of the Mediter- 
ranean, newly independent Algeria was issued with an instant navy 
comprising Komar and OSA missile-armed patrol boats, which could 
attack U.S. forces in the eastern approaches to the Gibraltar Straits. 
Of course, there is no guarantee that client states will remain true 
to their patrons and, since ‘missiles don’t know their mums,” they 
can be turned against their donors. However, these arms deliveries 
did serve to complicate NATO’s problems, and give some indication 
of Russia’s geostrategic interests. 
'48B. Blechman and S. Levinson ‘‘Soviet Submarine Visits to Cuba,’ United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings, September 1975, pp. 31-39. This article offers an extremely perceptive analysis of the 
motives underlying Soviet visits. 
'49Defence Space Business Daily, Nov. 13, 1975; reprinted in USNIP’s, February 1976. 
'59The 1956 Anglo-French operation against Suez provides a good example. A major cause of this 
debacle was the overestimation of Egypt’s military capability when using Soviet weapons, which led 
to the disastrous delay while an ‘appropriate’ type of force was laboriously assembled. 
69-315 O - 76 -- 11 
