148 
We can see, therefore, that while the Soviet Navy needs bases 
primarily to support its forward operations, it is not unmindful that 
some bases have greater geopolitical advantages than others. The base 
at Berbera is therefore of particular interest. It not only gives on 
to the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean; it also covers the 
southern approaches to the Red Sea. It is significant that the Soviets 
have chosen to station a Nanuchka-class missile patrol boat at Berbera, 
a unit which is well suited to the task of preventing passage through 
these approaches. 
THE PEACETIME ROLE 
We have already discussed recent operational developments under 
the same heading in Section II and in the last part of the previous 
section, and what evidence there is remains ambiguous. There is also 
the possible adjustment in the emphasis on the role and nature of 
a Soviet military presence, in the wake of the withdrawal from Egypt. 
And there is the leveling off in the deployment levels and in the 
use of naval forces for political purposes.'*! 
Meanwhile, public pronouncements tell us little. I have not 
researched the matter systematically, but I get the impression from 
three statements made within the last 20 months by Gorshkov,!? 
that although the emphasis continues to be on protecting and promot- 
ing state interests, the concept may now be limited to countering 
imperialist aggression against the Soviet bloc (the latter including the 
deployment of seaborne strategic units within range of Russia), and 
does not extend to imperialist aggression in distant parts of the world. 
This does not imply any reduction in the role of ‘increasing Soviet 
prestige and influence,’ but may indicate a step back from the risks 
of confrontation, anyway for the time being. 
THE NEXT DECADE 
In speculating on what lies ahead, it cannot be overemphasized 
that we do not have a full knowledge of the points at issue in the 
major policy debate which was in progress between 1969 and 1973. 
Nor do we know the nature of the compromise which appears to 
have been reached in 1973, or the extent to which this agreement 
is a lasting one. It does, however, seem fairly certain that one of 
the more fundamental and controversial points concerned the role 
of military force in achieving the Soviet Union’s international goals, 
'5'The two will of course be related. One can only do so much with a certain number of forces. 
Furthermore, the leveling off may reflect an operational decision about the number of forces it is 
possible/desirable to sustain on forward deployment, and may well have no immediate political sig- 
nificance. 
'82§. G. Gorshkov ‘“‘Na Okeanskoj Vakhte,”’ Krasnaya zvezda, Feb. 11, 1976; ““Boevye Vympely 
Rodiny”, Izvestia, Apr. 29,1975; ‘‘Morskaya Moshch’ Strany Sovetov"’, Pravda, July 28, 1974; V. 
Kasatanov ‘“‘Na Strazh Otechtsv”, Krasnaya zvezda, July 28, 1974. If this impression is correct, it 
need not conflict with Grechko’s more internationalist tone in his article in Voprosy istorii KPSS, No. 
5, 1974 (see note 56 above). His words can well describe the involvement of Soviet advisers, techni- 
cians and strategic logistic support (including the use of warships to ferry third-party troops), and 
need not imply direct involvement by Soviet combat units. 
