149 
in the light of the major developments between 1967 and 1971.'*% 
The arguments underlying the Gorshkov series were a significant input 
to that debate, but again, we have as yet no means of knowing 
the extent to which they may have influenced the direction of future 
Soviet policy. 
We do, however, know that “peaceful coexistence’”’ has been ac- 
cepted by the Soviet leadership as a long-term strategy, the term 
implying a mixture of competition, restraint and cooperation with 
the capitalist bloc in general, and the United States in particular. 
Shulman stresses that the important aspect of this relationship is its 
multilevel nature, which means that interactions on the various planes 
will often move in different directions.!°* He identifies seven planes 
of Soviet/U.S. interaction: (1) strategic-military competition; (2) con- 
ventional military competition; (3) political competition; (4) economic 
cooperation and competition; (5) ideological conflict; (6) cultural rela- 
tions; and (7) functional cooperation. The direction and intensity of 
the activity on each plane will differ according to circumstances, 
and may appear to conflict with the idea that “‘détente is indivisible.” 
The latter is a simplistic concept, whereas the Soviet Union prefers 
to talk of détente and peaceful coexistence, the latter being a formula 
for conducting business between opposing social systems, which rules 
out resort to interstate war, but accepts other forms of international 
competition as legitimate and indeed inevitable. 
We also know that the Soviet Union claims publicly that it “will 
continue to conduct a resolute struggle against imperialism, and firmly 
rebuff the evil designs and subversions of aggressors.” And, as in 
the past, it intends to “give undeviating support to the people’s strug- 
gle for democracy, national liberation and socialism’. In other 
words, Russia will continue to promote ‘‘national liberation move- 
ments” and other “progressive forces,” and to provide various kinds 
of support to client states. 
We have the facts of the SALT accords, the movement toward 
agreement on European security, the importance of domestic 
economic factors on all aspects of Soviet policymaking, the worrying 
state of Soviet agriculture,!°* and the serious lag in many areas of 
advanced technology. But we also know that the Soviet Union pos- 
sesses the world’s largest shipbuilding capacity, that existing surface 
warship yards could increase their production rates by moving to 
shift work, that the armaments industry could by reallocating resources 
support increased warship production, and that the facilities in most 
major shipyards (civilian and naval) continue to be expanded.'*” 
And finally, we may be coming to the end of the “1910 vintage”’ 
of senior naval officers, with the next generation moving in to the 
oe 
153 For example: the successful repression of Czechoslovakia; the move to political and military sta- 
bilization in Europe; the move toward strategic parity; the SALT probes; U.S. attempts to withdraw 
from Vietnam; the Nixon doctrine; the United States/China rapprochement; Soviet failure to get sup- 
port for a South Asian mutual security treaty; the danger of Soviet isolation; the rise of 
“revolutionary regimes” in Third World countries; Western overreaction to the Soviet naval presence 
during 1967 Arab/Israel war; marked operational benefits from access to Egyptian facilities; initial 
impact of military intervention in support of Egypt in 1970. 
54M. D. Shulman “‘Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy’’, Soviet Naval Policy, pp. 11-14. 
'5524th Party Congress of the CPSU, Novosti, Moscow, 1971, p. 39, Brezhnev’s report. 
'6See A. Nove “Will Russia Ever Feed Itself?” New York Times Magazine, p. 9. Feb. 1, 1976. 
'S7Based in part on remarks by Rear-Admiral B. R. Inman, Director of U.S. Naval Intelligence to 
the Advertising Club of Baltimore on Nov 26, 1975, as reported in Shipyard Weekly, Dec. 4, 1975. 
