151 
Looking forward to the period 1978-82, my impression is one of 
expectation. It seems very likely that the new family of third-genera- 
tion submarines which we may expect to begin series delivery in 
1977-78, will be configured to meet these demanding requirements, 
the more so since SSBN numbers will be up against the SALT limits 
by then. I would also expect a whole series of new weapon and 
sensor systems to enter service during the 5-year period, and to see 
a progressive shift in the pattern of the Soviet Navy’s war-related 
deployments, reflecting a major reorientation of operational concepts. 
This of course assumes that the Russians have been reasonably 
successful in their research and development. While it is usually possi- 
ble to perceive the nature of the Soviet Navy’s operational require- 
ments, it is much harder to foresee their choice of response, and 
in the past I have consistently overestimated their capacity to move 
from an innovative design concept to its practical application. How- 
ever, they have now been working at this problem for 15 years and 
the style of public pronouncements might suggest that something could 
be entering service within 2 to 3 years.'® And of course the Russians 
are inveterate and unconventional innovators. Their use of explosive 
shells at Sinope in 1855 wiped out the Turkish fleet and signaled 
the demise of wooden walled ships; 100 years later, the Soviet leader- 
ship took the decision that cruise missiles should become the main 
armament of the Navy. And in the war of 1877-78, although totally 
without a Black Sea fleet, Russian sailors shattered the Turkish Navy 
by the extensive and innovative use of torpedo-armed small craft. 
It seems possible that the centenary of this event will be of as porten- 
tous as that of the Battle of Sinope. 
The surface warship position is much less clear. Assuming that 
surface construction has now been brought into line with the 5- and 
10-year planning cycle,’ we might expect a new family of surface 
ships to begin delivery in 1980-82. However, if the Soviet Union 
has been able to develop some really effective counter-SSBN system, 
relying mainly on satellite, submarine, remote-sensor system and land- 
based weapon, what role is left for the large antisubmarine ships 
(Kara, Kresta II and Krivak), which now make up the bulk of distant- 
water new construction? And if the new system can handle submerged 
submarines, it should also be able to handle carriers. It is, of course, 
unlikely that any system can be equally effective in all circumstances 
(e.g., heavy traffic zones or shallow, shoal-infested waters), but it 
would be bound to have some influence on the need for surface 
ships in the distant-ASW role. And, since the task of ‘‘defending 
the home fleet areas’”’ has now been assigned to small-hulled surface 
units operating within range of shore-based support, the future of 
the larger surface ships would be in doubt. 
provided by H. Meier, I gather that U.S. research into this type of system in the early sixties 
(focusing on its potential for long-range strategic lift), showed that such a vehicle might carry a 
payload of 250 tons for 5,000 miles at about 90 knots, flying some 30 ft. above the surface; this gives 
twice the range of a comparable jet. Recent developments should enable the speed to be increased 
perhaps to 300 to 400 knots while retaining the same range. K. J. Moore suggests that there is no 
reason why small WIG vehicles should not be launched from a ship such as the Kiev, thus bypassing 
the hydrodynamic thrust/drag hump involved in taking off from the surface of the water. 
‘6? Past experience suggests there tends to be a 2-year leadtime between published claims and the 
operational availability of some capability. 
‘88 The original 20-year postwar naval building program had an 8-year ‘Final Delivery Period” 
which slipped 4 years and ran 1962-1969. This period was extended to 10 years for submarines, 
which now run on a 5 + 5 system. 
