152 
This may, of course, have lain at the root of Gorshkov’s arguments 
about the future allocation of resources to naval construction. Argu- 
ments which we can only infer, although he does stress that future 
naval construction must reflect scientifically constructed forecasts of 
future developments in science and technology, and that it takes years 
to build a ship.'®** But it also raises the question of whether the 
process we have observed since 1963 is not just a stop-gap solution, 
on the well-established Soviet principle that it is important to take 
some action against a threat to the homeland, even if it is not very 
effective;'® if nothing else, it serves to complicate the enemy’s 
problem. In this particular case it also served to gain intelligence 
on enemy patterns of behavior, and to develop new operational con- 
cepts and procedures. 
The existence of an interim policy, intended to hold the ring and 
gain experience while a final solution was under development, would 
explain several anomalies in contemporary Soviet policy. These in- 
clude: the reluctance to allocate additional resources to surface ship 
construction, even though existing units were to carry a heavy opera- 
tional load during this period; the failure to build additional afloat 
support ships (tenders) or to divert a small fraction of current 
merchant tanker construction to serve as fleet replenishment units; 
and the decision to base operational plans on the availability of shore 
facilities in the forward operating areas and on the continuing goodwill 
of the host country, and to bear the inevitable political costs. If 
this assessment of the original policy decision is correct, what then 
are the implications for the peacetime employment of Soviet naval 
forces in the next decade? 
THE PEACETIME EMPLOYMENT OF SOVIET NAVAL FORCES 
Perhaps the Russians did originally intend the forward basing of 
surface ships and submarines to be an interim measure, but policies 
gain their own momentum, situations change and new opportunities 
present themselves. What is more, the Soviet military rarely discard 
anything which may have some residual use, and are great believers 
in both belt and braces. 
There is also the special feature of naval strategy which ‘differs 
from military strategy in that it is as necessary in peace as in war. 
Indeed, in peace it may gain its most decisive victories by occupying 
in a country, either by purchase or treaty, excellent positions which 
perhaps could hardly be got by war. It learns to profit from all 
opportunities of settling on some chosen point of a coast, and to 
render definitive an occupation which first was only transient.’’ That 
‘64 Msb. 72/5/24/3:49/2/4. Gorshkov places notable stress on the importance of the “‘scientific,” 
‘mathematical,’ ‘‘objective’’ analysis of future naval requirements (72/2/20/3:1/2/2; 73/2/21/6-7; 
131/1/1/6, 2/1). This might imply that he is arguing against naval procurement decisions being taken 
by an army-dominated leadership on common-sense strategic rather than naval-professional grounds. 
Alternatively, it can be interpreted as intended to reassure those who argue that U.S. naval 
predominance is too great and the Soviet Union should avoid confrontation at sea. 
‘85 A good example of this principle is provided by the development of the Soviet air defense 
system since World War II. At the tactical level it is illustrated by the process of introducing naval 
weapons, where “‘initial application”’ often represents a form of operational development. See “‘The 
Turning Points of Soviet Naval Policy,’ Soviet Naval Developments, p. 183-4. 
