153 
is from Mahan,'® quoting an unnamed French author. And although 
the international political circumstances are now very different, and 
the nature of maritime warfare has changed out of all recognition, 
the last section of the passage could be used to describe Soviet 
behavior during the last 7 years. 
As we have seen, the geographical pattern of the Soviet Navy’s 
interest in shore facilities fits well with the explanation that Russia’s 
primary concern was to establish the strategic infrastructure needed 
to support the navy’s war-related tasks.'®*7 However, the question which 
now faces us is whether, irrespective of the original determinants 
of this policy, the Soviet Union has decided that naval forces are 
essential (or cost/effective) instruments of state policy in peacetime, 
and that a forward-base structure is necessary to support this role. 
The answer must lie in the future, although we can note that the 
Soviet political process militates against either/or decisions of this 
kind, and favors compromises, opportunistic decisions and incremental 
changes. There are, however, certain points to be made. 
The areas where the Soviet Navy has been seeking shore facilities 
all fit into the pattern of war with the West. However, Somalia has 
a wider strategic significance. Although I still hold to the opinion 
that the original decision to develop an operational capability in the 
Indian Ocean was part of the general policy requiring the Soviet 
Navy to move forward in strategic defense against U.S. sea-based 
strategic missile systems, developments in the Soviet involvement with 
Somalia would seem to reflect other considerations as well. The con- 
cern for the U.S. threat continues, and is sustained by the development 
of U.S. base facilities at Diego Garcia, and by congressional testimony 
that the Indian Ocean will be an operating area for Trident.'®® And 
I suppose that the Somalian base, if left undamaged, might have 
some use in world war, although the Suez Canal would be closed 
and, assuming that Russia had not already seized the Middle East 
oil fields, it would be simpler to sink tankers closer to their destina- 
tions than in the Indian Ocean. However, there is also the question 
of China and Southern Africa. 
There are two reasons for China being a strategic factor in the 
Soviet involvement in Somalia. First, Russian military planners must 
allow that in the event of war with China, the trans-Siberian railway 
would be cut, and supplies to the far eastern front would have to 
move by sea, the shortest route being through the Red Sea and across 
the Indian Ocean. They must also allow that China would seek to 
disrupt this line of supply, and they would have been particularly 
concerned by the presence of Chinese trade missions in South Yemen 
on the other side of the Gulf of Aden.'® 
166 A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783, London: Methuen, p. 22. 
'67See appendix A. The interests in the countries controlling the Mediterranean choke points fits 
into this same pattern. And of course, all the Mediterranean Arab States except Syria give access to 
some choke points or other, even Libya being strategically located between two. 
'681In justifying to Congress the basing of Trident SSBN in Washington State, a Department of 
Defense official made specific reference to the advantages of conducting patrols in the Indian Ocean 
from the Pacific Coast. U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Service Committee, Appropriation hearings 
fiscal year 1974, p. 728. 
168 This information dates from 1972 and has not been rechecked. 
