154 
Second, there is the threat to the Soviet Union’s southern or Middle 
Eastern flank. China is contained by Russian forces along some 4,500 
miles of frontier stretching from the Pacific to Afghanistan. But west- 
ward from there, the situation is open to political exploitation. 
Through Tibet, China abuts directly with Pakistan with whom she 
has close diplomatic relations, while Pakistan sees Russia as India’a 
powerful patron, and a direct potential threat to herself. Pakistan 
and Iran have cultural affinities, and the loss of Bangladesh has forced 
Pakistan to seek closer ties to the West. Meanwhile, there are long- 
standing enmities between Iran and Iraq, another client of the Soviet 
Union. All in all, Russia’s southern flank is ripe for Chinese political 
advancement. Russia’s own concern to physically contain China is 
demonstrated by the substantial military support she gave to Vietnam, 
by her unsuccessful proposal in 1969 for a south Asian mutual security 
agreement, and by her present-day policies toward the states which 
flank China’s southern borders. The Soviet Union remains equally 
convinced of China’s worst intentions, and cites Chinese interest in 
Western Europe and incitement in Eastern Europe as evidence of 
their attempts at encirclement. It is likely that Moscow sees war 
with China as a more serious probability than war with the West, 
and a military base in Somalia could be useful if China threatened 
to advance along Russia’s southern flank. 
It is probable that the need to insure the supply by sea of the 
Far Eastern front is the most important strategic factor, and would 
of course receive the full support of the ground forces. The access 
Somalia provides to the Middle Eastern flank would serve as a sup- 
porting argument. Southern Africa as a strategic factor is much more 
problematical, and although of greater interest to the West, it seems 
unlikely that this would have been a determining factor for reasons 
which will become clear. Perhaps the most serious development in 
that area would be if the U.N. General Assembly voted to enforce 
mandatory sanctions on South Africa by naval blockade, with Russia 
offering to provide the bulk of the forces. But in such circumstances, 
most of black Africa’s ports would become available and the Soviet 
Navy could select the ones most suitable for its purposes. The same 
considerations would apply in all circumstances where at least some 
black African states want Soviet naval intervention. And in any other 
circumstances, intervention would be politically counterproductive. 
Which brings us back to the primary determinants of Soviet involve- 
ment in Somalia. By becoming heavily committed to that country, 
the Soviet Union inevitably found herself on the opposite side to 
Kenya and Ethiopia, the latter still being very influential in the OAU 
at the time of Russia’s initial involvement; it also provoked adverse 
reactions amongst the many Franco-prone states which identified with 
Franco-Ethiopian interests in northeast Africa, and Malagasy was the 
most outspoken against Soviet activities in Somalia and in the Indian 
Ocean in general.!7” And it has generated widespread doubts about 
the Soviet Union’s aspirations in the Arabian/East African area, which 
the Chinese have been very ready to confirm. We may therefore 
assume that Russia’s primary interests were strategic and not political- 
influence building, an assumption which is reinforced by Grechko’s 
17 A. A. Castagno, ‘“‘The Horn of Africa and the Competition for Power,” A. J. Cottrell et al., the 
Indian Ocean: its political, economic and military importance, Praegers, 1972, p. 168. 
