156 
if) the exotic new systems come into service, will surface ships be 
released from the role of countering sea-based strategic delivery 
systems, and become available for other employment? Will surface 
warship construction continue at its present rate throughout the 
eighties, or will it be cut back, or might it even be increased? And 
whatever the building rate, will the characteristics of the new surface 
classes reflect the general-purpose requirements of a peacetime role 
in support of state interests, or will they continue to be primarily 
configured for nuclear missile war? 
And there remains the question of naval bases. Assuming that the 
new strategic defense systems have been designed to avoid reliance 
on the goodwill of distant states, the cost/benefit calculus for naval 
support facilities in foreign lands will change radically. Egypt is re- 
ported to owe Russia $6 billion for military supplies alone,’ and 
repayment would seem uncertain. The political costs are also high, 
not only in terms of the Soviet image, but in the influence which 
it gives the host country over Russian policy. Can these costs be 
justified by the benefits accruing from the employment of naval forces 
in support of state interests? If not, and if the arrangements for shore 
support are allowed to lapse, this will affect the possible levels of 
forward deployment unless afloat support is provided in lieu. However, 
because of the Chinese factor, Somalia is likely to remain an exception 
to this process, nor would any such change of policy apply to air- 
staging rights. 
Much of the emphasis in this discussion has been on why the 
Soviets have acted the way they have, and may act in the future. 
When possible, it is important to identify the primary determinants 
of policy, since this gives some indication of the level of political 
commitment behind the policy, and the level of risk which can be 
accepted in achieving its objectives. On the basis of the expenditure 
of resources, there is little doubt that there is a high political commit- 
ment to the mission of countering Western sea-based strategic delivery 
systems. There is also high political commitment to the containment 
of China and her defeat in war. We are, however, much less clear 
about the level of commitment to other policies, or even how the 
Soviets see the relative utility of various instruments of foreign policy; 
in particular, the role of military force outside the Soviet national 
security zone. These kinds of issue seem to have lain at the heart 
of the prolonged debate on the future direction of Soviet policy. 
If we are to respond constructively we need to know the answers 
to a whole range of questions, including the following: 
Having countered the U.S.A.’s advantage of being able to 
negotiate ‘from a position of strength” in the strategic field, 
by achieving nuclear parity, are the Soviets now seeking to 
achieve a comparable situation in the competition for world in- 
fluence, by countering the U.S.A.’s capability to project military 
force by sea? 
What priority does the Soviet Union attach to the task of 
‘“‘countering imperialist aggression”’ in distant parts of the world. 
Is it prepared to interpose Soviet forces and risk military conflict 
with the United States? 
'™3 London Times, February 21, 1976. 
