158 
That is water under the bridge. More important is whether contem- 
porary choices of Western policy can affect the type of answer to 
the questions we posed at the end of the previous subsection. In 
addressing this problem we should not assume that all, or even a 
majority of the Soviet leadership is convinced that traditional Western 
beliefs about the utility of naval force are applicable to the Soviet 
Union’s special circumstances, taking account of world trends, her 
particular ideological perspective, the likely balance of naval forces, 
and the wide range of alternative instruments which are available 
to her. Modern navies are costly instruments of policy, both to own 
and to operate, and there are likely to be many within the Soviet 
leadership who would prefer, other things being equal, to see some 
of these resources being applied in different ways. These alternative 
interests find it hard to make ground at the expense of the primary 
mission of defending Russia against attack from the sea, unless the 
threat is either reduced or the cost of its counter exceeds all rational 
bounds. There is, however, more room for argument about the navy’s 
peacetime role, and whether the navy should have any capability 
beyond that which is required to discharge the primary mission. 
Assuming that we are concerned to reduce the level of East/West 
confrontation at sea, we are therefore talking of the type of U:S. 
policy decision which would reinforce the arguments of those who 
are advocating a reduction in the allocation of Soviet resources to 
warship construction, or at least no increase. And also of those who 
for different reasons are against an assertive naval role in support 
of state interests in peacetime. We are talking of helping to fulfill 
the prophecies of the many different interests which are ranged against 
Gorshkov and the hardliners in the Soviet debate—and of trying to 
avoid fulfilling the prophecies of Gorshkov’s side of the debate, with 
their powerful arguments about the importance of a strong defense 
and the unpredictable nature of Western intentions. 
The problem is not an easy one, the more so since we are faced 
with two very different kinds of Soviet reaction. On the one hand, 
we have the well-established fact that the Soviet Union will strive 
to develop a defense against any threat to the homeland, almost 
irrespective of the costs involved. However, the ABM agreement does 
provide one example where the Soviets have desisted in their efforts 
to insure the protection of the center of government (anyway for 
the time being), partly it would seem because of the problems in- 
volved, and also because they could trade it in for other benefits. 
The Soviet Union is also prepared to seal off certain areas from 
military competition, such as the seabed and outerspace. 
On the other hand, we have the fact that the Soviet Union insists 
on maintaining an adversary relationship with the West, it is in open 
competition for world power and influence, and while acting as a 
status quo power in Europe, it actively advocates revolutionary change 
in more distant parts of the world. More important, her doctrine 
requires her to move forward whenever opportunities present them- 
selves. However, equally important, her doctrine gives no great ur- 
gency to what is seen as an inexorable historical process, and it 
castigates adventurism. Hence, the process while continuous, is cau- 
tious, although includes a fair measure of opportunism. 
