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There are two further points. While the Soviet leaders view the 
world through an ideological prism, they are Russians first and last, 
and a shrewd appreciation of where the Soviet Union’s long-term 
national interests lie within the existing international system, shapes 
much of their foreign policy. We must also return to the point that 
the Russians don’t throw things away. Having acquired some capa- 
bility, they will want to get some return on their investment, unless 
of course the costs of using it exceed the benefits. In discussing 
the implications of these various points on the choice of U.S. policy, 
I will once again distinguish between the war-related and peacetime 
roles. 
THE WAR-RELATED ROLE 
The threat facing the Soviet Union is nuclear-missile strike from 
the sea. A direct counter to this threat requires that she know the 
exact position of each launch vehicle all the time, and have some 
method of disabling at very short notice. The impact of future US. 
developments will to some extent depend on the approach the Soviets 
have adopted. If they are relying on trailing individual launch vehicles, 
there will be a direct relationship between the scale and extensiveness 
of the Soviet response on the one hand, and the number of U‘S. 
launch vehicles and their area of operations on the other. If, however, 
the Soviets have managed to develop some kind of area search solu- 
tion, its scale will not be tied directly to the number of launch vehi- 
cles, but will be affected by the range of the latter’s weapon systems. 
It would appear that the Soviets are developing some mix of the 
two approaches. 
On past experience one would therefore assume that Soviet sensor 
and weapon platforms will operate in the same areas as U.S. launch 
vehicles, and these platforms will certainly include submarines and 
probably also surface ships and aircraft for sometime to come. And 
if Trident opens up new operating areas, such as the Indian Ocean, 
Soviet forces will follow in its wake. Will this development be in 
U.S. interests? Why is it necessary for Trident submarines to operate 
in distant waters? In point of fact the Trident system provides a 
very good example of how the momentum of technological improve- 
ment can obscure the basic purpose of a weapon system. As a missile 
platform, the submarine brings the advantages of concealment and 
mobility. The relatively limited range of the early missiles meant that 
submarines had to operate in forward areas and that nuclear propul- 
sion was necessary in order to allow continuous submersion, and to 
evade Soviet counterforces. However, the Trident missile has the range 
to strike at Russia from U.S. coastal waters; the initial version can 
reach about 80 percent of the U.S.S.R. (including all the important 
areas), and the final system will be able to cover the whole of Russia 
and China. However, just as the missile has been improved, so too 
has the launch vehicle, which is now a very large, deep-diving nuclear 
submarine, carrying 20 missiles so as to lower the cost per launcher 
by spreading the capital cost of the submarine. But do we in fact 
need a launch vehicle of this type and cost? Has sufficient considera- 
tion been given to the advantages of a system which could be deployed 
within the protection of U.S. home waters? This would combine the 
