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security of land-based missiles (which are sited on sovereign territory) 
with the mobility and concealment of sea-based systems. It would 
improve the stability of deterrence and would not have to rely on 
forward bases. It would also allow the use of small diesel-driven sub- 
marines, which would be cheap and allow for weapon dispersion. 
But, more important in the context of this discussion, such a system 
would be essentially invulnerable except to some kind of barrage 
fire at the outbreak of war. This would provide solid arguments within 
the Soviet Union for ceasing their efforts to develop a continuous 
tracking system, and this, if accepted, would substantially reduce the 
Soviet requirement for sustained forward deployment. Meanwhile, 
diesel submarines would be operationally tethered to their home 
waters and protective ASW systems, and a choice of this kind would 
set a precedent for moving down the ladder of technology as well 
as up. It is relevant that the Delta class already has the capability 
to cover North America from Soviet home waters, although this choice 
was forced on the Soviet Union by the effectiveness of U.S. antisub- 
marine defenses. And at the 25th Party Congress Brezhnev has men- 
tioned an interest in reaching some agreement on the scope of Trident 
operations. 
Trident provides one example. The proposed strategic cruise missile 
is another. In each case we need to first ask what kind of response 
the new initiative will evoke from the Soviet Union and then consider 
whether at the end of the process we will be in a better position 
than we were before we started. In carrying out this process we 
should also look back at the past and, with the unfair advantages 
of hindsight, and of a better understanding of Russia’s long-term inten- 
tions and how she responds to different types of challenge, seek to 
draw lessons for the future. 
THE PEACETIME ROLE 
The problem of influencing the development of the peacetime em- 
ployment of naval forces is obviously far more complex, but certain 
factors should be borne in mind. 
On the negative side of the account we have the fact that the 
numbers and characteristics of Soviet distant-water forces are deter- 
mined by the requirement to discharge the war-related tasks. At 
present they lack any appreciable surplus of capability over these 
requirements, and in times of sustained crisis, such as in the Eastern 
Mediterranean during the last three months of 1973, the navy is 
hard pressed to sustain these tasks. However, in times of low tension, 
they make use of these same forces for political purposes. If Soviet 
naval force requirements are predicated on the threat posed by 16 
U.S. strike carriers supported by several ASW carriers, a sharp cut- 
back in these U.S. numbers will have a corresponding effect on Soviet 
force requirements and, if the forces have already been built, will 
release a surplus of naval capability over essential defense require- 
ments. This ‘disposable surplus’”” could then be made available for 
other types of employment in peacetime. 
A second negative factor is the Soviet Union’s perception of herself 
as a coequal of the United States and her strong resentment of the 
U.S. policy of negotiating “from a position of strength” during the 
