161 
sixties. It seems clear that this was a major factor in her decision 
to go for nuclear parity. Continuing Soviet statements emphasize that 
future negotiations on a wide range of international matters must 
be conducted on the basis of equality, and it is not certain what 
importance they attach in this context to the U.S. capability to project 
conventional force by sea. 
The third negative factor concerns the strong possibility that the 
Soviet Union will misinterpret the West’s public reaction to various 
international developments. The evidence suggests that the Soviets 
were unprepared for the political impact of their forces’ presense 
in the Mediterranean during the 1967 Arab/Israeli war.'7 Western 
commentators not only grossly over-reacted, but went on to insist 
that a Soviet naval presence must necessarily paralyze Western 
maritime initiatives, and ridiculed official statements pointing to the 
exposed nature of Soviet deployments. Although unofficial, it seems 
probable that these ill-informed but widespread reactions had an ap- 
preciable effect on the internal discussions during 1969 on the role 
of a Soviet military presence overseas, and misled the Soviet leadership 
as to the true nature of future Western reactions. In the same general 
context but in a completely different way, the West’s vehement reac- 
tion to the Soviet involvement in Angola is likely to encourage further 
initiatives of this kind. 
There are also several factors on the positive side of the account. 
First, the historical record shows that with two important exceptions, 
the Soviet Union does not appear to attach the same importance 
to the utility of military force as an instrument of foreign policy 
as does the West.'"© The two exceptions concern her immediate na- 
tional security zone, and the possession of military strength as the 
foundation of her diplomacy, but neither is directly related to the 
peacetime role of naval forces. The Soviet Union appears to share 
the widespread doubts about the value of acquisitive military interven- 
tion; and she is hesitant to take the risks of supportive intervention. 
Western experience since the war highlights the political and financial 
costs of direct military involvement in local wars, added to which 
the Soviet Union is particularly sensitive to charges of imperialism. 
With very rare exceptions she is seeking influence, not territory, and 
with the wide range of instruments available to her, military force 
can be reserved for vital interests. | am not suggesting there is anything 
moral about this; just a careful appraisal of political costs and benefits. 
Such objectivity is helped by the absence of a past tradition of using 
force in this particular way. Meanwhile, the real opportunities are 
past. During the 20-year breakup of empire that followed the war, 
during which the West fought a series of rearguard actions to delay 
withdrawal, then was the time for Soviet forces to come to the help 
of ‘“‘national liberation movements.’’ What now faces Russia in the 
ex-colonial nations are old-fashioned interstate power struggles, or 
the turmoil of civil war. 
> See ‘Soviet Naval Interests and Intentions in the Caribbean,” Soviet Naval Policy, p. 478. 
"6K. Booth, The Military Instrument in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-71, Royal United Service In- 
stitution, London 1973. A shortened version of this appears as “‘Military Power, Military Force, and 
Soviet Foreign Policy.” in Soviet Naval Developments, p. 31-56. See also “‘Soviet Naval Policy: 
Prospects for the Seventies,”’ ibid., pp. 502-506. 
