162 
The second positive factor is Soviet sensitivity to political and 
economic costs. This factor has underlain much of the discussion 
in this chapter, but it is worth reemphasizing the actual economic 
costs of operating naval forces in distant sea areas, and the substantial 
savings of resources that can be effected by withdrawing distant-water 
forces to home fleet areas.'!77 This implies that should the Soviet 
Navy achieve a disposable surplus of general-purpose capability over 
the requirements of its primary war-related mission, it does not neces- 
sarily follow that it is in Russia’s interests to use these naval forces 
in an assertive peacetime role. . 
The third positive factor is the Soviet Navy’s awareness of the 
exposed nature of their distant deployments and their evident concern 
about Western reactions to their initiatives. There are numerous exam- 
ples of this, ranging from the low profile adopted during the early 
years of the Mediterranean deployment, to the combat formation 
adopted when ferrying Moroccan troops to Syria in 1973. This con- 
cern extends to the dangers of escalation inherent in East/West con- 
frontation at sea, particularly when high value units armed with 
nuclear weapons are involved. 
And the fourth positive factor is Western naval preponderance and 
the control we have of our own policy and our responses to Soviet 
initiatives. The latter cover the full range of policy instruments but 
I will mention three aspects only. The first involves our response 
to the incremental approach which the Soviets adopt when launching 
new initiatives. Our contingency planning should cover these in- 
dividually insignificant actions and establish in advance where we will 
call a halt. The second involves international public relations and 
how we handle the Soviet presence in distant waters. At the moment 
we tend to emphasize exclusively the high quality of their ships and 
the threat they pose to the West. The potential threat is true enough 
but we still need to present a more balanced picture, biased, if 
anything, the other way. In the international sphere we should concen- 
trate on publicizing the Soviet Navy’s adverse features, its limited 
capabilities, its personnel and maintenance problems; its dependance 
on other countries’ facilities and the exploitative nature of the relation- 
ship; its primary focus on its strategic defensive mission to the neglect 
of client states; how its presence introduces great power confrontation 
to the area; and so on. And the third aspect involves the nature 
of our response to major Soviet initiatives. 
This last is a very complex matter and most important in terms 
of Western policy implications. It is directly tied into the Soviet 
Union’s concern to be seen as a coequal with the United States, 
and her resentment of the latter’s ‘from a position of strength” policy. 
The problem is how to discourage the development of the more asser- 
tive aspects of the Soviet Navy’s peacetime role, while avoiding a 
situation where the Soviet leadership feels so constrained in their 
actions, that they are provoked into placing greater emphasis on the 
role of force in achieving Russia’s international goals. Somehow, the 
correct balance has to be struck between the extremes of invariable 
acquiescence to Soviet initiatives, and automatic attempts to frustrate 
them. I suspect that the answer lies in a clearer appreciation on 
the one hand of how the Soviets perceive the contemporary-interna- 
"7 See ‘The Economic Costs of Forward Deployment,’’ Soviet Naval Developments, pp. 228-236. 
