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tional (as opposed to long-term revolutionary) “‘legitimacy”’ of the 
policies they are pursuing, and on the other hand of where the West's 
own long-term interests lie. Recent events in Angola provide a useful, 
if controversial example of this approach. 
The Western alliance in general had long been embarrassed by 
Portugal’s colonial policy. Although it was not prepared to take posi- 
tive action in the matter, it welcomed the political coup in Lisbon 
and the decision to grant independence to Portugal’s African colonies. 
Russia had been working to the very same end (if for somewhat 
different reasons), and had been providing support to one faction 
of the ‘freedom fighters,’ whose guerrilla warfare was mainly instru- 
mental in effecting the reversal of Portuguese policy. 
In the internal struggle for power which followed the announcement 
of forthcoming independence, Russia continued to provide relatively 
modest support to her marxist-oriented client-faction, stepping it up 
when U.S. financial support was channeled to one of the opposing 
groups. She however reacted much more vigorously when the highly 
successful intervention by a small South African force threatened to 
drive her proteges from the field. Nominally at the latter’s request 
she brought in Cuban troops armed with Soviet weapons, which turned 
the battle in favor of the MPLA. 
The West shouted “foul,” and waxed indignant at the intervention 
by Cubans, which is somehow seen to have broken the “rules.” It 
is true that the West and certain African states wished to see another 
form of government emerge in Angola, and one can suppose that 
Soviet interest prevailed. But by the West’s own standards the Soviet 
action would appear to have been ‘“‘legitimate.’”’ Indeed, even if we 
ignore recent Western precedents of comparable involvement, it is 
hard to see what else the Russians could have been expected to 
do in the circumstances. They had been supporting the MPLA for 
10 years, and to have deserted it at this crucial juncture would not 
only have had adverse effects on the Soviet Union’s image in Africa, 
but it would have been morally reprehensible, even by the lax stan- 
dards of international political behavior. 
For the West to use its naval capability in such circumstances 
to prevent the supply of Soviet arms by sea, would be the type 
of action calculated to strengthen the hand of those in Moscow who 
are arguing that Russia needs a worldwide naval capability, in order 
to protect and promote her state interests in peacetime. It would 
appear that in the case of Angola, wiser counsels prevailed, and 
in any case the United States did not take such action. However, 
the other forms of Western reaction (particularly their public 
pronouncements), were such as to promote Russia’s_ interests 
throughout Africa at the expense of our own; and more serious, to 
convert what was essentially a series of Soviet reactions to rapidly 
evolving and unforeseen circumstances, into a highly successful exam- 
ple of the use of military power. 
WESTERN INFLUENCE ON SOVIET DECISIONS 
I have described a complex structure of interactions and pointed 
out some of the ways in which Western action can affect Soviet 
decisions on future policy. To influence Soviet policy we have to 
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