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understand it, and a first step in this direction is to cease thinking 
solely of Western vulnerabilities and to focus on the nature of the 
Soviet Union’s interests and requirements. As we have seen, a wide 
range of domestic factors are primary determinants of Soviet national 
policy and even in the core area of insuring the security of the 
homeland, the possibility of war with China has a major influence 
on military requirements and the direction of foreign policy. And 
while the competition for world influence is a significant component 
of Soviet foreign policy, it is by no means the most important, nor 
is the competition solely with the West. 
The desirability of influencing Soviet policy is easier to assert than 
to implement. When we consider which action will further this aim, 
we will think mainly in terms of “encouraging” favorable develop- 
ments and ‘discouraging’ those which seem against our interests. 
But we have to be on guard against the inversion of the effects 
of our action which takes place when indiscriminate “discouragement” 
serves to provoke truculent Soviet reactions, and _ thoughtless 
‘““encouragement”’ offers Russia the temptation to exploit new opportu- 
nities. Unilateral force reductions come within the latter category, 
and raise the possibility of creating a ‘‘disposable surplus” of Soviet 
naval capability over Russia’s essential defense requirements. U.S. 
budgetary decisions concerning the number of naval strategic systems 
such as carrier strike forces or Poseidon submarines, must not only 
reflect Western requirements, but the effect such decisions will have 
on Soviet policy options. 
In conclusion, I return to the basic question of Russia’s interest 
in the use of the sea. The evidence which has accumulated since 
1945 in terms of her allocation of resources, the pattern of maritime 
activity and the ton of public pronouncements suggests that the Soviet 
Union’s primary interest has been to exploit the living resources of 
the sea, and to use the sea for trade, aid and arms supply in distant 
parts of the world. She is also deeply concerned about the threat 
of attack from the sea with nuclear weapons. For a nation such 
as the United States of America, which has been weaned on Mahan’s 
milk and brought up on the puberty theory of sea power,!’® it is 
hard not to assume that Russia must also want to use the sea to 
project military force in peacetime. But this is in no way self-evident. 
Traditionally, the navy’s primary mission has been to defend Russia 
against attack from the sea and this same mission persists today. 
Russia has almost 300 years of naval history behind her, and for 
the last 200 years her navy has been the third or fourth largest 
in the world. But most of this time it was seen as an expensive 
necessity and not as a cost/effective instrument of an assertive foreign 
policy. In other words, not only are our circumstances, problems, 
and priorities different, but so are our traditions and historical ex- 
perience. 
It is not therefore inevitable that Russia will seek to develop a 
powerful navy for peacetime use. Indeed, it seems more likely that 
the question of the navy’s cost-effectiveness as a political instrument 
in peacetime has yet to be finally resolved. If this is so, then “sobriety 
'® The “Puberty Theory of Sea Power”: ‘‘As great powers become superpowers they need global 
navies, the same way that as little girls become big girls they need frontal support.’’ The culture- 
bound origins of the theory are reflected in the fact that the second part of the analogy does not hold 
worldwide. 
