165 
in Western conduct’? becomes particularly important as an input to 
the Soviet policy process, aimed at “‘strengthening the defensive, sta- 
bilizing tendencies of Soviet foreign and naval policies.’’'” In practical 
terms this means that in our own policies we should take account 
of the Soviet Union’s concern about the strategic threat from the 
sea, and the reaction this has evoked in the past. At the same time, 
we should offer discouragement by word and deed to the notion 
that a powerful Soviet Navy could ever become a cost-effective instru- 
ment of state policy in peacetime. 
APPENDIX A 
THE SOVIET NAVY’S SHIFT TO FORWARD DEPLOYMENT 
Most specialists in the field now accept that the initial shift to forward deployment 
was a response to the threat to Russia from seaborne nuclear delivery systems. Despite 
this general acceptance, some still find it hard to concede that this strategic imperative 
was a primary determinant of Soviet naval policy in the Mediterranean. A larger 
number have yet to accept that the same strategic plan shaped the second phase 
of the deployment. They argue instead that the motivation was political and primarily 
intended to extend Soviet influence. There is a decreasing minority who date this 
shift in policy to the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and a few go back to Lebanon 
in 1958. 
This disagreement is worth exploring, since the why of policy is at least as important 
as the what, and serves to indicate the type of political commitment there is to 
different policy outcomes. This is particularly relevant to the peacetime employment 
of naval forces, where the relative levels of political commitment and willingness to 
take risk is likely to determine the outcome of naval confrontations in distant sea 
areas. 
Unquestionably, the Soviet Union has sought to exploit the presence of its naval 
units on forward deployment for political purposes, and after 1968 there was a marked 
rise in foreign port visits. The Soviet Union has also been increasingly concerned 
to contest the West’s unhindered use of the sea to project military power in distant 
parts of the globe, and presumably the possible political spinoffs from forward deploy- 
ment would have been a factor in the decisionmaking process. But this does not 
mean that political influence building was the primary determinant of this costly shift 
in naval policy. To assert that it was is to ignore the evidence in terms of when 
the decision was taken, the areas chosen for deployment and the operational employ- 
ment of the forces within these areas. 
First the dates. It was in 1959 that Khrushchev announced the Soviet Union’s inten- 
tion to concentrate on submarines and stressed the limited utility of surface ships;' 
the truth of this claim is supported by shipbuilding evidence and reflects a decision 
which was probably reached in 1957-58.? That is, despite the role played by Soviet 
surface ships in the 1957 Syrian crisis, and the landing of U.S. Marines in Lebanon 
in 1958, the Soviet leadership chose not to give any priority to the peacetime employ- 
ment of naval forces. And yet in 1959, the Soviet Navy was in a much better position 
to establish a surface presence in the Mediterranean than when they set about the 
task in 1963-64, when there had been a virtual 4-year hiatus in surface ship construc- 
tion. 
The decision that the navy should move forward in strategic defense was almost 
certainly taken before the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961 (i1.e., 12 months 
before the Cuban missile crisis), and there was mounting evidence of this change 
in policy by February 1962.* In October, Marshal Malinovskij had indicated a substantial 
revision (and in some ways a reversal) of the new defense policy announced by 
Khrushchev in January 1960, which appears to have been prompted by what was 
seen as the major shift in America’s policy, following Kennedy’s inauguration. Undoubt- 
edly, the experience of Cuba influenced the debate about what was needed to imple- 
'79 Franklyn Griffiths ‘“‘Forward Deployment and Foreign Policy,’’ Soviet Naval Developments, p. 
14. 
'R.W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, Annapolis, Md., United States Naval Institute, 1967, p. 67. 
2See ‘‘The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy” in Soviet Naval Developments p. 202. 
3E.g. the series of articles and statements rehabilitating the role of surface ships, which began to 
appear in 1962 (see Herrick, op. cit. pp. 72-74); and the key appointment of Admiral Kasatanov 
(subsequently 1st Deputy commander in chief of the Navy), to be commander in chief northern fleet 
in February 1962. 
