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ment the shift to forward deployment. But to claim (as some do) that Cuba ‘taught 
the Soviet Union about sea power” is to disregard the preceding 200 years of Russian 
naval history, and to imply that maritime policy derives from some arcane science, 
rather than from a balancing of priorities. 
Next, deployment areas. The eastern Mediterranean is significant to the Soviet Union 
in both strategic and influence building terms. But her physical involvement in Egypt 
has worked to her long term disadvantage, and the nature of her demands for naval 
support facilities in June 1967, labeled Russia as “‘imperialist’’ in Nasser’s eyes.* One 
must therefore conclude that strategic requirements had priority over political influence- 
building in the eastern Mediterranean. Indeed in the case of the UAR, one can question 
who is influencing whom.® It appears that the buildup of arms which enabled the 
Egyptian attack in October 1973, was Russia’s reluctant payment for a 5-year renewal 
of the base agreement. Somewhat the same arguments apply to the Caribbean. The 
base at Cienfuegos aroused strong U.S. reactions,® and the fact that the Soviet Union 
heeded them would not have impressed Castro. Meanwhile, the Cuban base is not 
necessary to political influence building in the area, but is essential as a means of 
cutting down time in transit for submarines deployed to counter U.S. naval strike 
units. 
Turning to West Africa, we see that none of the three states courted by the Soviet 
Navy (Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Senegal), provide an important entre to politi- 
cal influence in Africa, but they are strategically located in terms of Soviet naval 
requirements. The Soviet Union would gain considerable advantage by establishing 
a naval capability on NATO’s southern perimeter along the Tropic of Cancer. This 
would expose the lines of communication between the United States and the Mediter- 
ranean; it would place Soviet forces in a blocking position should U.S. carriers sail 
for the South Atlantic at the outbreak of war;7 and a point d’appui in the area 
would give access to the northern arm of the Cape Verde ocean basin, which extends 
northward as far as the Bay of Biscay, straddling the approaches to the Mediterranean. 
In this latter context, Dakar (in Senegal) and the Cape Verde Islands are particularly 
well located. As confirmation of the Soviet Navy’s operational interest in this region 
we have the deployment of a submarine tender and a missile support ship in the 
summer of 1967; these ships spent some 5 months at sea in the general area of 
the Cape Verde Islands in company with a number of submarines.’ From this one 
might infer that it was originally hoped to develop some system of open ocean support, 
but since that proved impractical, the Soviet Union set out to acquire access to bases 
in the region. 
If the primary purpose of the Mediterranean deployment had been political, then 
the comparable deployment for the Soviet Pacific Fleet would have been the South 
China Sea, where there were many similarities in terms of superpower rivalry, U.S. 
naval presence, and political opportunities. If the deployment were primarily strategic, 
then the area which compares most closely with the eastern Mediterranean in terms 
of potential threat and target coverage, is the Arabian Sea. So far, the Soviet Union 
has not sought to establish a combatant presence in the South China Sea (which 
is only about 2,000 n.m. from Vladivostok), but has instead chosen to sustain a deploy- 
ment in the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean, another 4,000 n.m. further away.® 
The sharp change in the pattern of port visits in the Indian Ocean during 1968-71 
falsifies the hypothesis that the primary reason for this deployment was political. It 
appears that during the first three deployments the area was surveyed for possible 
bases, Berbera in Somalia was chosen, with Aden as a secondary alternative. After 
1969, very few visits were made to other countries. We also have the phenomenon 
(as in the Cape Verde area) of a submarine tender with submarines in company, 
spending over 3 months at sea in the area (December 1968 to March 1969), before 
the decision to go for a base. 
*See Mohamed Heikal, ‘The Road to Ramadan,” Collins, London 1975. Extracts published in 
Sunday Times (London), April 27, 1975, pp. 34-5. According to Heikal, Podgorny asked for a com- 
mand post and repair shops guarded by Russian marines, and to fly the Russian flag. Nasser retorted 
“This is just imperialism. It means we shall be giving you a base.’’ Podgorny backed down, but the 
damage had been done. 
*See A. Z. Rubinstein “‘The Soviet-Egyptian influence relationship since the June 1967 war” in 
Soviet Naval Policy, pp. 153-181. 
5See B. Blechman and S. Levinson ‘‘Soviet Submarine Visits to Cuba,” United States Naval In- 
stitute Proceedings, September 1975, pp. 30-39. 
7 Admiral Kharlamov discusses the likelihood that carriers will be transferred to the ‘‘second 
wave"; Morskoj sbornik, January 1966. U.S. admirals were discussing this option in the early sixties. 
*See ‘Soviet Naval Policy: prospects for the seventies” in Soviet Naval Developments, p. 496. 
*See “The Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployments in the Indian Ocean, 1968-71" in Soviet Naval 
Developments (supra), pp. 425-441. 
