167 
Then we have the operational employment of the forces on forward deployment. 
Despite the increase in naval port visits since 1968 and specific examples of Soviet 
naval forces being used for political purposes, these activities represent a very small 
proportion of the overall pattern. The latter is characterized by the amount of time 
spent in strategically located “picket” and “holding” positions by forces not directly 
engaged in marking western naval units, and by the little time spent in visiting ports 
other than their ‘‘bases’ in the forward operating areas.'® An analysis of such port 
visits concludes that the majority reflect primarily operational requirements (fuel, water, 
provisions) rather than a carefully orchestrated political plan.'' Furthermore, a high 
proportion of these visits are made by submarines which, however powerful, are sinister 
and externally boring, and generally considered to be less persuasive than surface 
ships in the influence-building role. There is also the persistent emphasis on securing 
facilities ashore for operating long-range aircraft. Rather than building influence, the 
satisfaction of this strategic requirment involves cashing in on political influence which 
has been acquired through other means. 
And finally, we have the evidence from the design characteristics of the new-construc- 
tion and conversion programs which have entered service during the last 5 years. 
First, we have the emphasis on close-range air defense and sided gun-systems. This 
suggests a requirement for self-defense against a coordinated all-sector attack, and 
the limited reload capacity similarly suggests defence against a concerted preemptive 
attack, rather than an engagement of one’s own choosing. Second, we have the designa- 
tion of all these ships as ‘‘antisubmarine”’ units of one kind or another. This is significant 
in itself, but if I am right that the main missile armament is antisubmarine rather 
than antisurface (note 11 in the main paper), then the evidence is very powerful. 
In either case, the absence of missile reloads implies a single strike, rather than multiple 
or sustained engagements. And third, we have the overall composition of the Soviet 
Navy, with its heavy emphasis on submarines and aircraft, which is highlighted by 
the repeated emphasis given to these two arms of service, with surface ships coming 
a poor third. 
There is, therefore, a growing body of concrete evidence in the shape of the shipbuild- 
ing and weapons programs, the pattern of deployments and the operational employment 
of naval forces, which points to the priority given to tasks of countering the West’s 
seaborne strike capability. This evidence is reinforced by what the Soviets say about 
the navy’s missions in their press and publications, and have been saying for the 
past 14 years. All together, this evidence supports the hypothesis that the primary 
determinant of the Soviet Navy’s forward policy was the strategic defense of the home- 
land against the threat of attack from distant sea areas. 
It does not mean that ships will not be used for political purposes, or that priorities 
may not change in the future, but so far, the predominance of general war-related 
tasks has persisted. What we cannot know, is whether the evidence we now see reflects 
future intentions, or the inertia of discarded policies. 
APPENDIX B 
THE PURPOSE OF THE GORSHKOV SERIES 
Irrespective of the content of the Gorshkov series, it is important to know whether 
the primary purpose of these articles was to announce a new policy or doctrine, 
agreed by the politico-military leadership, or whether it was to argue a case of some 
kind. The answer has to rely mainly on subjective judgments concerning the balance, 
tone and thrust of Gorshkov’s writing, and will be influenced by conclusions concerning 
‘““content.”” And because of this subjective element, it is proper to consider where 
the balance of informed opinion lies on this matter. 
The most widely held opinion (to which I subscribe) considers that the primary 
purpose of the Gorshkov series was to argue a case and to persuade.' He does other 
10For instance in the Mediterranean, Soviet units move to strategically located operational 
anchorages; Alboran Island and Mellila Point east of the Gibraltar Straits, the Gulf of Hammamet 
and Hurd Bank, covering the Sicilian Channel; and the anchorages to the east and west (Kithera) of 
Crete, covering the approaches to the Aegean. Kithera and Hammamet are the two main ones. 
Oral presentation by A. Kelly at “Soviet Naval Developments—III,”’ seminar 8 to 11 Sept. 1974. 
‘In 1974 Franklyn Griffiths wrote “‘There is a dwindling debate as to whether Gorshkov was ad- 
vocating or announcing a policy in this presentation. Increasingly it is believed that Gorshkov was en- 
gaged in advocacy” (“‘The Tactical Use of Naval Arms Control,” Soviet Naval Policy, p. 641). In a 
straw poll of participants at the 1973 seminar on Soviet Naval Developments the great majority 
favored ‘‘advocacy.” 
