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APPENDIX C 
POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT IN THE GORSHKOV ARTICLES Z 
This appendix examines in detail certain conclusions drawn by James McConnell 
from his analysis of the Gorshkov series. 
As the result of a comprehensive and most valuable review of Soviet military writing, 
McConnell has identified an important distinction between the meanings and usage 
of two Russian words, which are both rendered in English by “‘defense.’’ He concludes 
that the term ‘‘oborona”’ is used when talking of the military-political aspects of national 
defense, while the terms ‘“‘zashchita’”’ implies military strategic tasks, and that this 
distinction is consistently observed. 
Applying this distinction to the Gorshkov series, McConnell goes on to argue that: 
1. When Gorshkov uses oborona in a contemporary naval context, he is referring 
to the role of ballistic missile submarines in deterring attacks on Russia from 
the sea, and in a withholding role in war. 
2. The Soviet Union intends to withhold submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
from the initial exchange, for use as a diplomatic instrument during the war and 
subsequent peace negotiations. 
3. Other naval roles, including that of directly countering U.S. ballistic missile 
submarines, have been downgraded. 
The implications of McConnell’s argument are significant, and many of them run 
counter to other types of evidence. His conclusions rest heavily on his interpretation 
of the scope of oborona as used by Gorshkov, which he sees as being restricted 
to the deterrent role of ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). I have therefore avoided 
becoming embroiled in the details of McConnell’s reasoning and concentrated on the 
textual material from which he draws this particular conclusion. On the basis of this 
analysis, | conclude that: 
1. The use of oborona is not restricted to the deterrent role of SSBN. In 
fact, on the two occasions when Gorshkov is most explicit about the scope of 
the term, he uses it to cover the role of the general-purpose forces deployed 
to counter the West’s seaborn strategic delivery capability, and their secondary 
employment to deter the projection of traditional military force by Western navies. 
He also uses it in ways where it is difficult to define its limits, but which definitely 
include the role of general-purpose forces. On only one occasion does he use 
it in a context which might refer only to SSBN. 
2. The task of countering Western naval strike units has not been downgraded, 
but is now “even more important.” 
I also address the matter of a “withholding” strategy for Soviet ballistic missile 
submarines. The option of withholding missiles from the initial exchange is inherent 
in any reasonably invulnerable system, and for operational reasons one would expect 
at least a proportion of SSBN to be held back. SSBN are part of the Soviet Union's 
general war-fighting capability and decisions on their use will be related to evolving 
military-strategic requirements and the military-political opportunities to influence the 
outcome of the war. This matter is not discussed in the open literature, nor can 
anything be inferred on this score from what Gorshkov writes, except to note that 
he does not approach the subject. 
GORSHKOV’S USE OF THE TERM OBORONA 
The question we have to answer is ““What role does Gorshkov have in mind when 
he speaks of the navy’s part in national oborona?”’ My analysis divides into five stages. 
First, I look at those occasions when Gorshkov either refers to ballistic missile sub- 
marines (SSBN) or to the naval role of strategic strike. I then turn to analyze each 
of the three references where Gorshkov links the Strategic Rocket forces (SRF) and 
the Soviet Navy together in some capacity. These four stages are sufficient to clearly 
identify the scope of oborona as used by Gorshkov on these occasions. In the fifth 
stage I compare these conclusions against the other occasions when he uses oborona. 
REFERENCES TO SSBN OR TO THE NAVAL ROLE OF STRATEGIC STRIKE 
There is one ambiguous reference (which I consider at the fifth stage of this analysis), 
and three others. All of the latter appear in the final article and in none of them 
is there any accompanying reference to oborona, nor are there any links with the 
SRF. 
Two of the three references are short: (1) “... nuclear weaponry has _permit- 
ted the navy’s submarine forces to become part of the country’s strategic nuclear 
forces ... The ballistic missiles of submarines have insured the capability of destroying 
