175 
Compare this with the ballistic-missile submarine force. The Soviet Navy took delivery 
of its first ballistic-missile submarine in the latter fifties and has had nuclear propulsion 
since 1959. The only changes have been in the size and performance of the submarine 
platform, and in the number and range of the missile it carried. When Gorshkov 
said in 1967 that the navy ‘had now gone out onto the wide ocean expanses,” the 
Soviet Navy had only nine Hotel SSBN, which had been in service since 1960-62, 
and the first Yankee would not become operational before 1969. The pattern of 
SSB/SSBN deployment changed very little between 1964 and 1972, and even in that 
year, only three Yankee SSBN were maintained on ocean patrol.’ Meanwhile, the 
Delta, with its 4,200 nautical mile missile, is designed to operate from the safety 
of Russian home waters, representing a withdrawal from the ocean expanses. 
Further evidence that Gorshkov is talking about the distant-water general-purpose 
forces, is provided in the third paragraph of “‘D.” He there ties in “‘the strengthening 
of our fleet on the oceans” with the “forced draught development of (the USA’s) 
naval forces and the creation of new problems for the defense of the Soviet Union 
which are difficult to resolve.”’ This refers to the sharp acceleration of the Polaris 
program initiated by Kennedy in January 1961, and the shift in U.S. emphasis from 
land-based to sea-based strategic delivery systems. This shift to sea-based systems has 
been referred to regularly by Soviet naval commentators over the last 10 years, and 
is given as the reason why the navy now has to defend the homeland from attack 
in distant sea areas. It is also widely accepted by Western analysts that this was 
the underlying cause of the shift to forward deployment. 
Finally, we should note that, except for the link between “‘SRF” and ‘“‘ocean-going 
fleet,” there is no evidence within quotation ‘““‘D” to suggest that the SSBN force 
is the subject of discussion. And, as we have already seen, in the other cases where 
the SRF is linked with the navy, in one of them the context specifically excludes 
SSBN (“B”), and in the other the context precludes ‘‘the navy” referring only to 
SSBN. There is therefore no reason why “‘ocean-going fleet” in quotation ““D”’ should 
tefer to the SSBN force. 
THE CONCLUSIONS SO FAR 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we can conclude that, in the extracts quoted, 
Gorshkov was discussing the role of the Soviet Navy’s general-purpose forces in distant 
sea areas. This role falls into two parts. Their main mission (which they share with 
the other branches of the armed forces) is the defense (oborona) of the country 
against attacks from the ocean axes. They also serve as an instrument of defense 
(oborona) on the ocean axes, against imperialist aggression. The latter includes both 
the use of Western naval forces as general instruments of expansionist foreign policy 
(including repressing liberation movements), and the aggressive deployment of Western 
nuclear strike forces (carrier and submarine) which serve as an instrument of nuclear 
blackmail. (72/12/19-20) 
These distant-water forces (the ocean-going fleet) are linked with the SRF in this 
oborona role, and between them, they provide the foundation of the counterforces 
of defense (kontrosily oborony), which oppose the forces of aggression in the world 
oceans. 
OTHER REFERENCES TO OBORONA IN THE GORSHKOV SERIES 
It is not part of my argument that oborona is used exclusively to refer to any 
particular role. 1 am merely concerned to show that it is used by Gorshkov in connection 
with roles other than deterrence and with forces other than SSBN, which I have 
already done. Does this hold in the remaining cases? 
There are five examples of the use of oborona in the last article, three of which 
appear in the eight concluding paragraphs. Gorshkov uses oborona in the first of 
these paragraphs, but nothing can be inferred about the scope of the term. (73/2/24/6) 
In the sixth paragraph he uses it three times, two of which tell us nothing. The 
third is more informative and refers to the party paying attention ‘boosting the defensive 
might of the state, to strengthening its armed forces, to increasing its sea power, 
and to the harmonious, balanced development of forces of an ocean-going navy.” 
(73/2/25/2) Obviously oborona is not limited to SSBN in this context. The last example 
is in the seventh and penultimate paragraph of the conclusion and refers to the duty 
of Soviet Navy men to maintain ‘‘a high state of readiness of all naval forces to 
carry out tasks of defending the state from the maritime axes, and in every way 
7See “The Evolution of Naval Policy,” Soviet Naval Policy, p. 516. Some 20 Y-Class were opera- 
tional at that period. 
