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to improve the skills of employing combat equipment under any climatic and weather 
conditions.’ (73/2/25/4) Climatic and weather conditions are not a factor in the opera- 
tions of SSBN; they are very important for surface ships, for naval aircraft and for 
the forward support of submarines. 
The other two references appear at the beginning of the chapter. He starts off: 
“In taking into account the importance of questions related to the strengthening 
of the country’s defense (oborona) from the maritime axes, the Soviet Union 
. . is constantly strengthening her own seapower, including several necessary 
components.” (73/2/18/2) 
and then goes on to mention oceanographic research, the merchant marine 
and the fishing fleet, but concludes: 
“However, we must consider the most important component of the seapower 
of the state to be the navy, whose mission is to protect state interests on the 
seas and oceans and the defense (oborona) of the country from possible attacks 
from the direction of the seas and the oceans.” (73/2/18/8) 
The first reference is not limited to SSBN and takes in the wider aspects of seapower. 
The context of the second oborona is less clear and I am of the opinion that the 
paragraph which follows it is a ‘“‘break”’ paragraph, as Gorshkov moves from discussing 
seapower in general to the need for a powerful navy. However, McConnell sees them 
as all part of the same argument, which links the second oborona to the following 
six paragraphs. These describe the decision to build a new oceangoing navy in response 
to maritime encirclement, which would deter the aggressive aspirations of the enemy, 
and go on to make an enigmatic reference to the mere presence of the fleet presenting 
‘‘a potential aggressor with the need to solve the same problems which he had hoped 
to create for our armed forces.’’ This can be interpreted as referring to the SSBN 
force, although the whole passage is obscure and it could be picking up a reference 
from the previous chapter on ‘“‘Navies as Instruments of Peacetime Imperialism.”” How- 
ever, this could be our one example of oborona linked with SSBN, although at six 
paragraphs removed. 
On the basis of just these five references, the conclusion can again be drawn that 
Gorshkov’s use of the term oborona is not limited to the role of SSBN and extends 
to include general purpose forces. 
CONCLUSIONS 
On the basis of what Gorshkov wrote in ‘“‘Navies in War and Peace,” there appear 
to be no grounds for assuming that when he uses oborona he is always referring 
to the deterrent role of SSBN. He uses oborona 12 times in the last 2 chapters, 
and for 6 of them the context indicates that the term includes the role of general 
purpose forces. 
In the concluding section of his chapter ‘“‘Navies as Instruments of Peacetime Imperial- 
ism,” Gorshkov describes the Soviet Navy’s two peacetime roles; defense of Russia 
against attacks from the sea, and defense on the sea against imperialist aggression. 
He uses oborona for both and the context makes it clear that he is referring to 
general purpose forces in distant sea areas, and not to SSBN. On one occasion only 
can oborona perhaps be linked (at six paragraphs removed), with a possible allusion 
to SSBN, however, oborona is not used in any of the three references which specifically 
mention SSBN or the naval role of strategic strike. 
As used by Gorshkov, national oborona implies a very active defense role, countering 
Western naval strike forces, deterring imperialist aggression in distant sea areas and 
being prepared to deliver retributory blows in those areas. The peacetime employment 
of naval forces in this way falls within McConnell’s definition of national oborona 
as covering the political-military aspects of defense. 
Gorshkov only once talks of strategic nuclear deterrence and does not use oborona 
in that context. This is not to suggest that nuclear deterrence is not part of national 
oborona. However, the lack of specific reference to that task does raise the question 
of whether the navy’s SSBN force is now perhaps subsumed under the generic term 
of strategic rocket forces. 
THE TASK OF COUNTERING POLARIS/POSEIDON 
As far as I can see, McConnell only offers two specific items of evidence from 
the Gorshkov series, to suggest that the task of countering Polaris/Poseidon has been 
deemphasized. 
One is Gorshkov’s statement that ‘‘missile-carrying submarines, owing to their great 
survivability compared to land-based launch installations, are an even more effective 
means of deterrence.’ (73/2/21/2—3: 131/1/2-3) This comes in a two-paragraph section 
in the final chapter, which discusses the navy’s contribution to the Soviet Union’s 
strategic delivery capability. 
