177 
The other is a comment on the very high ratio of antisubmarine forces which were 
required to limit the operations of diesel submarines in World War II, and how much 
higher the requirement would be against contemporary nuclear submarines. 
(72/11/26/6:101/2/1). This appears in a 5,000-word chapter which concentrates entirely 
on the maritime aspects of World. War II, and over half of which is devoted to 
discussing the battle for sea communications, from which discussion McConnell extracts 
this comment. 
There appears to be absolutely no analytical justification for lifting these two state- 
ments from their contexts, three chapters apart, and offering them jointly as evidence 
on quite a different matter, namely that Gorshkov is announcing that the counter- 
Polaris role is being deemphasised. Gorshkov devotes a large amount of space to 
discussing the battle for sea communications in World Wars I and II (his analysis 
represents 6 percent of the whole series), he obviously considers the. subject important 
to his theme, and it is in that general context that this particular remark about nuclear 
submarines must be evaluated. The most satisfactory explanation is that Gorshkov 
is pointing out that the task of attacking Atlantic sea communications will require 
many less submarines than the Germans deployed, both because of nuclear propulsion 
and because the West will lack the relative advantages it had in World War II.® 
It fits in to Gorshkov’s argument for a balanced fleet and more surface ships. 
Meanwhile, Gorshkov makes only one specific reference to the operational aspects 
of countering Polaris, and that is favorable. In a passage which discusses the new 
weapon, sensor and propulsion systems which were then entering service, Gorshkov 
remarks that nuclear propulsion is transforming submarines into ‘‘veritable underwater 
ships” and goes on to comment that they “‘are also becoming full-value antisubmarine 
ships, capable of detecting and destroying the enemy’s missile-carrying submarines.” 
(73/2/20/1:130/1/6) 
For the rest, there is a strong element of circularity in McConnell’s argument. He 
concludes that the role of countering Polaris has been downgraded and that it is 
intended to withhold the SSBN force from the initial exchange. He therefore assumes 
that Gorshkov’s remarks concerning the need to provide effective surface and air 
support for submarines, must refer to the protection of this force in the home fleet 
area; this in turn will draw forces back from the role of countering Western strike 
units. But once again the question of context is ignored. Gorshkov’s remarks are 
made in the course of his analysis of the battle for sea communications in World 
Wars I and II; they concern the lack of surface and air support for offensive submarine 
Operations, both in support of the submarines themselves and as a general adjunct 
to the type of operation. The context therefore suggests that Gorshkov’s concern is 
for the support of submarines on distant operations rather than in the fleet areas. 
Another form of circularity can be found in the argument that: (a) oborona covers 
the deterrent role of Soviet SSBN; (b) Gorshkov uses oborona when talking of defense 
against attacks on Russia from the sea; therefore (c) defense against seabased strike 
systems now depends upon the deterrent effect of the SSBN force, and (d) direct 
efforts to counter Western strike forces will be reduced. We have already shown 
that the use of oborona does not imply the deterrent role of SSBN. But what McConnell 
has never explained is why the Soviet Union would perceive their SSBN force as 
providing a specific deterrent to attacks from the sea, since nuclear deterrence lacks 
that particular kind of symmetry. 
However, the most persuasive reason for not accepting that the Soviet Union is 
deemphasizing the role of countering Polaris/Poseidon, is that the operational and 
material evidence argues the contrary to be the case.? Moreover, Gorshkov explicitly 
refers to this task in his final chapter, when he describes the “‘basic mission of great 
power navies in a world-wide nuclear war.”’ He lists three tasks and the second is 
“weakening (oslablenie) nuclear strikes by enemy naval forces from the ocean axes:” 
(70/2/2/8:131/2/2). This is a naval mission, in which context ““‘weakening” can only 
imply direct action against the enemy weapon platform, or the weapon itself within 
a few moments of launch. 
®Gorshkov goes to some lengths to show the disparity of effort invested by the two sides in the 
Battle of the Atlantic (72/11/25—28:100-102). He points to the advantages which lay with the West 
in having the time and facilities to build up both the ASW forces and their merchant tonnage, 
whereas Germany had to divert resources to her Eastern Front. He points to the very high ratio of 
ASW forces to U-Boats and notes that the diesel submarine was never driven from the sea. He then 
says “the question of the ratio of submarines to antisubmarine forces is of great interest even under 
present-day conditions,” and poses a rhetorical question about the scale of escort forces which would 
be required to counter nuclear submarines. Of course he knows the scale of escort forces which face 
the Soviet Navy today, and how few they are by comparison to the ASW effort which was deployed 
in the Atlantic toward the end of the war. 
® There are off-the-record statements by senior U.S. Defense Department officials to this effect. See 
also note 61 of the main paper. 
