178 
The Soviet Union appears to be continuing to give high priority to this task, a 
conclusion which is supported by their public pronouncements. A recent example occurs 
in a Navy Day interview given by Gorshkov to Pravda in July 1974." 
“The navy has always had two main tasks . . . combat against the enemy fleet 
and operations against the shore. For long centuries the first of these tasks had 
priority. But, beginning with World War I the situation began to change. Now, 
if we are to judge by the developmental tendencies of navies and their weapons, 
the main naval mission (glavnaya missiya flota) is coming to be operations against 
targets on land. 
“Therefore, defense (oborona) of the country against an attack from the sea 
is acquiring for our armed forces an even more important significance. This is 
again the result of the development of submarines, which in a series of navies 
are now coming forward as the main platform for strategic nuclear-missile weapons. 
“Of course, the task of combating the enemy fleet is still with us . . . If required, 
Soviet navymen know how to solve both these tasks successfully.” 
Gorshkov’s statement seems reasonably straightforward and may be clearer if we 
invert the first two paragraphs: “‘National defense against attack from the sea is acquir- 
ing an even more important significance, because the main mission of navies (in general) 
is to attack targets on land.”’ This leaves undecided whether attacks against land 
targets is the main mission of the Soviet Navy (as well as navies in general). But 
it is clear that defense against such attacks (the threat of which lies mainly in sub- 
marines) has become even more important. That is, it has always been important, 
but is now even more so. It is also the task of the armed forces, and not just the 
navy. 
But there remains the third paragraph, which implies that ‘‘combating the enemy 
fleet’’ is not part of ‘“‘national defense (oborona) against attack from the sea.’’ McCon- 
nell, partly on the basis of his particular interpretation of the usage of oborona, argues 
that ‘tnational defense’’ must therefore comprise attacks against land targets, or the 
threat of such attacks. However, this will only hold if one assumes that “countering 
Polaris/Poseidon’”” must necessarily come within the general task of ‘‘combating the 
enemy fleet.” 
It is true that in the past the destruction of carrier strike forces and the struggle 
against Polaris, together with other tasks were lumped under the general heading of 
“destroying the enemy’s naval forces.”’ But this is hardly sufficient reason for concluding 
that there has been a major change in the established priorities accorded to tasks. 
We have already shown that national oborona is not limited to the deterrent role 
of SSBN. We have the concrete evidence that the Soviets are continuing their efforts 
to develop some form of counter to Polaris/Poseidon. And finally there are at least 
two plausible explanations of why Gorshkov used this form of words: 
a. His audience. This was a question and answer session in Pravda, for the 
benefit of a nonprofessional readership. Gorshkov is making the point that the 
main maritime threat now comes from Polaris/Poseidon submarines, rather than 
carrier task forces and other general purpose naval forces. Defense against 
Polaris/Poseidon is now the first priority, but of course, the navy must still be 
able to handle the rest of the ‘‘enemy fleet.” 
b. Redefinition of terms. On the one hand we have the possible indicators 
that the SSBN force is now considered as part of the SRF. And on the other, 
we have the evidence that defense against Polaris/Poseidon concerns the armed 
forces as a whole, and not just the Soviet Navy. Taken in conjunction with the 
evidence of a debate on roles and missions in 1970-73,'' this may have resulted 
in a redefinition of terms, whereby Polaris/Poseidon is no longer classified as 
part of “‘the enemy’s fleet.” 
There would therefore seem to be no reason why we should not take what Gorshkov 
says at face value, and conclude that measures to counter Polaris/Poseidon continue 
to receive high priority within the Soviet armed forces. 
1°§. G. Gorshkov ‘Soviet National Sea Power,’’ Pravda, July 28, 1974. Where I say “the main 
naval mission,» McConnell says ‘tthe main mission of the Navy.’’ The Russian word flot (navy) is 
never capitalized, and neither the grammar nor the context suggest that Gorshkov is talking about the 
Soviet Navy (as McConnell’s rendering implies), as opposed to navies in general. 
"! John Erickson ‘Soviet Defense Policy and Naval Interests,"’ Soviet Naval Policy, p. 60. 
