Mis) 
WITHHOLDING SovieT SSBN 
GENERAL BACKGROUND 
The Soviet Union and the United States appear to have different operational require- 
ments for their respective ballistic-missile submarine forces. The U.S.A.’s calculations 
are dominated by time-urgent targets and concern over being presented with a fait- 
accompli in Europe, and it is this plus various traditional assumptions, which require 
such a high proportion of Western units to be kept on missile-launch station. Soviet 
requirements would appear to be more simple. The deterrent mission relies on the 
certainty of retribution, not its speed; it is therefore only necessary to insure that 
the submarines escape the initial exchange and are able to deliver their missiles in 
due course. Similarly with the war-fighting mission; there are relatively few time-urgent 
targets which require submarines within range at the outbreak of war. To meet these 
requirements only a few units need be on station. 
From the Soviet point of view, there would seem to be many advantages in keeping 
only a small proportion of the total SSBN force deployed. It allows a larger number 
of units to be at sea in times of tension; it requires only one crew per boat (a 
costly item); it reduces the maintenance load and increases operational availability; 
and it denies the enemy a full measure of his problem. But most important of all, 
it increases the security of the force. As the result of their lenghthy (and at times 
embarrassing) exposure to U.S. antisubmarine defenses, Soviet naval leaders must be 
aware of the danger that, should it decide to do so, the United States would be 
able to take out all Soviet SSBN on distant patrol at one fell swoop. On the other 
hand, the chances of Soviet submarines reaching their firing positions safely will be 
greatly improved once war has begun. Opposing ASW forces and sensor systems are 
likely to have been put out of action at an early stage, and chances of success would 
be enhanced if the SSBN swamped the remaining Western defenses by deploying en 
masse. This surge deployment would apply mainly to the Yankee class, whereas the 
Delta would be able to cover targets within North America, from the relative security 
of the home-fleet areas. 
In terms of the need to provide support and protection to Soviet SSBN, the Yankee’s 
requirement would be considerably greater than the Delta’s. Both classes would need 
a secure home-fleet area. But the Yankees would need the additional support required 
to insure their safe transit to within missile-firing range. The entry into service of 
the Delta class would not appreciably increase the requirement for defense of the 
home-fleet area. If anything, the Delta’s capacity to fire directly at its target from 
the waters of coastal fjords (or if threatened with attack), might seem to lessen this 
particular requirement. 
Since 1968, the SSBN force has been linked with the SRF in both the deterrent 
and war-fighting roles,'? and would presumably participate in a common strike plan. 
The Yankee class began to enter operational service in 1969, during the last 2 years 
of the ICBM build-up.'* Because of the time-lag in the submarine reaching its firing 
position, it seems possible that some if not most of the Yankees have always been 
used to cover targets missed in the initial exchange, or have been held back in reserve 
to strike at targets of opportunity. Although all the Delta class have the capability 
to participate in the initial exchange, it seems quite probable that they would carry 
on the same kind of role as the Yankee; this is the more likely since they began 
to enter service after the numerical build-up of ICBM was complete. One can also 
assume that if no targets of opportunity presented themselves, and if there was no 
requirement to strike at targets missed by the SRF, then the SSBN would continue 
to be held back to see how things developed. 
The Soviets may believe that the United States is planning to carry on the war 
after the initial exchange, by taking over some undamaged part of the world as a 
socioeconomic base. In that case, the Soviets would wish to hold back SSBN so 
as to deny the United States that option. Similarly, if they believe that the United 
States intends to withhold some Polaris, they would probably wish to hold back at 
least some of their own, on the off chance that there would be any targets left 
to strike. 
The option of being withheld from the initial nuclear exchange is inherent in any 
weapon system which has a high chance of surviving that exchange. The problems 
of reconnaissance, targeting, command and control will be immense. But the way 
in which such systems are used will depend on the unforseeable circumstances and 
requirements of the post-exchange period. It is unlikely that a military-political leader- 
ship would be prepared to tie their hands as to use or non-use, in advance. 
"2V. D. Sokolovskij ““Voennaya Strategiva,"’ Moscow 1968, pp. 235, 240-43. 
See “Soviet Strategic Weapons Policy 1955-70,” ‘“‘Soviet Naval Policy,” p. 494, table 27.1. 
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