180 
EVIDENCE FROM THE GORSHKOV SERIES 
The preceding review seeks to establish the general operational context surrounding 
the employment of Soviet SSBN, and to clarify the kind of options and constraints 
which will have shaped Soviet decisions on this score. Elsewhere in this paper, we 
have noted that the Soviets do not separate out the idea of nuclear deterrence from 
the general concept of defense.'* The security of the homeland ultimately depends 
on the capability to repel (or at least absorb) any attack, and then go on to win 
the subsequent war. 
Along with other weapon systems, submarine-launched ballistic missiles are seen 
as instruments both of deterrence and war-fighting.’° As part of the Soviet Union’s 
military capability, they will contribute to determining the outcome of a war and 
the nature of any ensuing peace. 
In Gorshkov’s historical review of past wars, the great majority of discussion is 
concentrated on. the conduct of naval operations in those wars. Apart from his analysis 
of operational trends, he places most emphasis on the capacity of navies to enable 
the actual conduct of war and on their contribution to the outcome. By comparison, 
and contrary to what McConnell suggests, Gorshkov devotes relatively little space 
to the influence of navies on the outcome of peace negotiations. 
Going back to the 17th and 18th centuries, Gorshkov notes that in the war with 
Sweden (1703-21), the Russian Navy generally became “the most important factor.” 
(72/3/25/4:16/1/1) He shows that the deployment of a squadron to the Mediterranean 
drew away Turkish ground forces from their northern front in 1770-74; that the 
fleet made up for army weakness on the Baltic front and cut off support to Turkish 
forces on the Black Sea in 1788; and that the navy helped again in 1828-29. In 
1853-56, it was naval superiority which allowed Britain and France to reverse Russia’s 
initial victory over Turkey and extend the war around Russia’s borders; and in 1878 
the lack of a Russian fleet allowed a British naval presence to deter the Tsar’s armies 
from taking Constantinople. Gorshkov notes that naval victories in the war with Sweden 
(1713-21) and against Turkey (1770-74) were very important to the favorable peace 
treaties which followed. However, the navy’s victories in the Aegean in 1807 had 
no effect on the Tilset peace talks, when Napoleon forced Russia into an alliance. 
In the Spanish-American war, Gorshkov emphasises how U.S. naval superiority al- 
lowed America to project its own military forces and prevent the reinforcement of 
Spanish forces. (72/4/16/4—5:30/1) In the Sino-Japanese war, it was naval power which 
enabled Japan to seize Taiwan and the Ryukus, to occupy Korea and to concentrate 
its forces at will on the mainland. (72/4/17/3-—4:30/2-31/1) After the Russian defeat 
at Tsushima, their lack of a fleet meant that although ground force superiority could 
be built up again, it would not be possible to carry the war to Japan. (72/4/22/3:34/2/5). 
In World War I, Germany launched an unrestricted submarine campaign in an 
attempt to force Britain “to capitulate before the arrival of American troops in Europe,”’ 
and as the single possibility ‘tif not to achieve victory, at least to conclude an honorable 
peace” (72/5/17/3:44/2/2); the submarine campaign allowed ‘“‘Germany to continue 
the war.” (72/5/18/3:45/2/3) Meanwhile, naval operations in the Baltic and Black 
Sea had a ‘‘considerable effect’’ on the outcome of the war in those theaters (72/5/18/5, 
19/4:45/2/5, 46/1/4). In the Russian Civil War, it was Western navies which enabled 
“constant support” of the enemy's forces, which would otherwise probably have given 
up. (72/6/17/4:58/2/1) In 1940, despite her ground and air superiority, Germany found 
“it was impossible to force (England) to surrender, without sufficient naval forces” 
(72/9/17/2:80/1/2) But German naval operations did enable the supply of Scandinavian 
iron ore. (72/9/16/6:79/2/1) Western naval operations in the Mediterranean disrupted 
Rommel’s supply lines and enabled the landing of allied armies in North Africa and 
Italy. In the Pacific, the war was primarily naval, although U.S. naval superiority 
was not sufficient to force Japan to capitulate. Despite the continental nature of World 
War Il, naval operations made a significant contribution to the outcome, particularly 
in secondary theaters, and the struggle for sea communications in the Atlantic and 
Pacific weakened the belligerents’ economies. 
This summary (which is not exhaustive) is sufficient to show that Gorshkov’s domi- 
nant theme is that navies are important to the outcome of wars, and that one pays 
a price for naval inferiority or defeat. Wars are fought for political goals; the outcome 
of a war obviously affects the terms of peace, and Gorshkov mentions a few of 
these. But he only refers to three occasions when “‘naval forces in being’’ affected 
the course of peace negotiations, and two of these involved interference by third 
parties. The first was the Congress of Berlin (1873), when Britain was able to reverse 
many of the gains won by Russia in its war with Turkey. And the second was at 
'Tbid., pp. 486-7. 
'5 See note 10. 
