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the end of the Sino-Japanese war (1895), when Russia, Germany, and France forced 
Japan to relinquish her claim to the Liaotung Peninsula by threatening her sea lines 
of communications. (72/4/17/9:31/1/3) The third occasion was the Treaty of Paris 
(1856) after the Crimean War, when Franco-British naval dominance of the Black 
Sea allowed them to dictate the terms of peace. 
However, in none of these three cases is Gorshkov really talking of ‘‘navies in 
being” and in the two Black Sea cases he is referring to the ability of naval forces 
to project effective military power inte distant sea areas. Meanwhile, the main thrust 
of his conclusions on these two wars with Turkey is that as soon as “the major 
capitalist powers of Europe’? became concerned over Russia’s attempts to gain egress 
to the Mediterranean, ‘“‘the relative weakness of the Russian Navy was immediately 
apparent,” and Russia was not only unable to profit from her victories on land, but 
was sometimes forced to concede defeat. (72/4/15/4-5:29/1/4) This is all part of the 
special emphasis which Gorshkov places on the Black Sea and the Mediterranean." 
How then does McConnell arrive at his conclusion that Gorshkov is announcing 
a new “doctrine of conserving forces’ based on a “‘fleet-in-being’” of SSBN? Partly 
from a selective reading of the historical analysis. Partly, it would seem, from the 
meaning he gives to oborona. But it also stems from what Gorshkov says about the 
Battle of Jutland; or rather, what Admiral Belli said about Jutland in 1964, with 
which Gorshkov is now meant to be in disagreement. Let us first look at what Gorshkov 
says about Jutland: 
“The fact is, that in this engagement Germany had the goal of defeating the 
British fleet to insure freedom of action, in order to crush England by a subsequent 
unrestricted naval blockade, that is to achieve a sharp change in the course of 
the war to its advantage. A victory by the German forces would have permitted 
the Central powers to extract themselves from a naval blockade whose severe 
effect was already being felt by the German economy. But the German fleet 
did not achieve the goal it was set. 
“Great Britain, on the other hand, was striving through this battle to retain 
her existing position on the seas and to strenghthen the blockade operations against 
Germany. She achieved these goals.” (72/5/16/2—3:43/2/2-3 ) 
Gorshkov makes no reference to peace negotiations, which at this stage lay 30 
months ahead. In fact, he chooses to emphasize the opposite aspect, pointing out 
that ‘‘the Battle of Jutland determined the immutability of the further course of the 
prolonged war and helped to keep it in its former channel.” (72/5/16/4:43/2/4) Of 
course, in Western terms his analysis is fairly conventional, and it also fits well with 
the emphasis Gorshkov places on the struggle for sea communications. What, then 
is the nature of his disagreement with Belli, and how significant is it? 
Gorshkov only mentions two opinions (held by ‘“‘many analysts’) with which he 
is in disagreement: (1) the fleet commanders (particularly the British) were indecisive 
and reluctant to risk major combattants in order to achieve complete victory: and 
(2) Jutland did not influence the outcome of the armed struggle. (72/5/15/11:43/1). 
However, McConnell claims that by implication, Gorshkov is overturning some much 
more fundamental criticisms, which have traditionally been leveled at Jutland by Soviet 
historians. He explains that: 
‘‘Admiral Belli has contended in 1964 that both the German and the British 
Navies had a ‘doctrine of conserving forces’ in World War I, their ‘method’ being 
that of the ‘fleet-in-being’, German doctrine was only partly motivated by the 
desire ‘to have an argument when conducting peace negotiations’, but this was 
said to be the entire sum and substance of the British approach; the Admiralty 
sought to preserve its fleet ‘as an important factor at the moment of concluding 
peace’. In Belli’s view this ‘politico-strategic’ approach was wrong; military strategy 
should have been allowed to take its course’’.!” 
Because Gorshkov now disagrees with Belli on certain points, McConnell concludes 
that Gorshkov has espoused the alleged British doctrine of “conserving force in order 
to influence peace negotiations’. But is McConnell justified in assuming that because 
Gorshkov disagrees with certain of Belli’s judgments, Gorshkov must therefore hold 
all the ideas which Belli has criticized as fallacious? Belli accuses the British of thinking 
about the navy’s role in future peace negotiations, whereas they should have concen- 
‘6 The Black Sea and Mediterranean between them account for about 10 percent of the total text. 
This figure does not take account of their appearance in discussion of the naval operations in World 
Wars I and II. 
'TThis is a summary version of McConnell’s full argument which appears in ““Gorshkov’s Doctrine 
of Coercive Naval Diplomacy in Both Peace and War’’, Admiral Gorshkov on “Navies in War and 
Peace"’, CRC 257, Center for Naval Analyses, Washington, September 1974, pp. 78-79. 
