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trated on the battle and risked their ships to achieve a major victory. However, Gorsh- 
kov argues that the British were not thinking about future peace negotiations, but 
were concentrating on the immediate requirement to continue with the war along 
its established course. There was no point in risking their ships in search of a needless 
victory; the military-strategic requirement was to avoid defeat so that the fleet could 
continue with its existing wartime tasks. 
There would seem to be every reason to take what Gorshkov says about Jutland 
at its face value. It fits in with the theme and structure of his argument, it makes 
good military sense, and he clarifies where he disagrees with established opinion. Signifi- 
cantly, he does not take issue with Belli’s criticism of withholding weapons to influence 
the peace. There would seem to be absolutely no reason (in logic or in kreminology) 
for concluding that Gorshkov is in fact saying something quite different to what he 
writes; that he is not really talking about the major engagement at the midpoint 
of World War I, but is justifying a policy of withholding SSBN as a means of influencing 
peace negotiations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence in the Gorshkov series will not support the conclusion that Gorshkov 
is advancing a doctrinal rationalization for the political decision to withhold a substantial 
portion of Soviet SLBM in order to carry out ‘‘deterrence” in war, conduct intra- 
war bargaining and influence the peace talks at the end of the war. 
Should war occur, the use of SLBM in some or all of these ways is of course 
quite likely. Gorshkov does not however approach the subject, even by analogy, and 
his arguments concentrate on demonstrating the importance of navies in providing 
military access, and the effect of naval operations on the outcome of war. Gorshkov 
shows no particular interest in the concept of a “fleet in being’’ and its potential 
influence either on the outcome of war, or on the subsequent peace negotiations. 
If he had wanted to present this case, his naval historians could have produced a 
clutch of examples to bolster his argument. 
The SSBN force, together with the SRF, comprise the main striking power of the 
Soviet Union. Because of the system’s characteristic it is likely that at least a proportion 
of SLBM will not be used in the initial exchange. SSBN are part of the Soviet Union’s 
general war-fighting capability, and decisions on their use will depend on evolving 
Operational requirements, the course and nature of the war, and the opportunities 
to influence its outcome. It is not clear why the Soviets should consider it necessary 
at this particular juncture to produce a convoluted doctrinal rationalization for a process 
that is inherent in the weapon system. But if they did think it necessary, one would 
then expect the message to be clearly articulated and readily discernible by its reader- 
ship. 
