MILITARY-POLITICAL TASKS OF THE SOVIET NAVY IN 
WAR AND PEACE 
(By James M. McConnell ') 
Over the course of 1972-73 the monthly journal of the Soviet 
Navy, “The Naval Digest,” published a series of 11 articles by its 
Commander-in-Chief, Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorsh- 
kov. For Gorshkov this was an unprecedented effort and it is un- 
derstandable that the series should have aroused attention in the West. 
Unfortunately, Western analysts have not been able to come to a 
meeting of the minds either on the content of the articles or on 
the question of whether Gorshkov was lobbying or speaking authorita- 
tively—and this too is understandable, since he does not make it 
easy for us to interpret him. 
I myself take the position that Gorshkov is probably speaking 
authoritatively, that his work represents, not a doctrinal statement 
as such, but what the Soviets refer to as a “‘concrete expression 
of doctrine,” i.e., a work rationalizing particular tenets of military 
doctrine that apply to the navy. In my opinion, the content of the 
Gorshkov series reflects a Soviet political decision to withhold a sub- 
stantial portion of their submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) 
from the initial strikes in order to carry out ‘“‘deterrence”’ in war, 
conduct intrawar bargaining and influence the peace talks at the end 
of the war. This is essentially what the Russians call a ‘“military- 
political task”’ in the “‘system of national defense”’ as contrasted with 
““military-strategic tasks” in the ‘“‘combat system of the armed forces,”’ 
1.e., it is a task directly imposed by the “‘political and military leader- 
ship of the state’’ embodied, presumably, in the Higher Defense Coun- 
cil, rather than by the subordinate “‘strategic leadership of the armed 
forces” embodied in the Higher or Main Military Council at the 
level of the armed forces. 
The decision to withhold has apparently imposed new requirements 
on the navy to protect the ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) and 
insure its combat viability. This task was not necessary earlier when 
naval missiles were apparently intended for the initial salvos and their 
carriers did not have to survive over a protracted period in a hostile 
environment to discharge their mission. Gorshkov especially stresses 
the protective value of aviation and surface ships, but he does not 
specify whether the resources for this support role are to come out 
of new allocations or reallocations from other missions. In this connec- 
tion, it is interesting that, simultaneously with the apparent emergence 
of the withholding mission as the navy’s main task, the Soviets are 
placing less doctrinal stress on its former main mission—that of 
‘“‘combating the enemy fleet.’’ Since it seems unlikely that this would 
‘The author is on the Staff of the Center for Naval Analyses. The ideas expressed in this paper are 
those of the author. The paper does not necessarily represent the views of either the Center for 
Naval Analyses, the U.S. Navy or any other sponsoring agency. 
(183) 
