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involve a downgrading of the antisurface ship component of that mis- 
sion (especially since “getting the carrier’? would promote the success 
of the withholding mission, because of the carrier’s antisubmarine 
warfare (ASW) potential), the lessened stress on combating the enemy 
fleet suggests a shift in priorities from the anti-SSBN to the pro- 
SSBN mission. In contrast to the past, when optimistic pronounce- 
ments were made on the state of the art in ASW, Gorshkov stresses 
the “great survivability” of the SSBN in comparison with land-based 
launch facilities, especially if the submarine is given protection. Since 
no invidious distinctions are made between Western and Soviet SSBNs 
in this regard, the “great survivability’’ theme would seem to serve 
a dual purpose. On the one hand, it rationalizes the decision to 
withdraw resources from the task of combating Poseidon in order 
to support the withholding mission; on the other hand, it affirms 
the viability of the Soviet SSBN in its new military-political task of 
withholding. 
While one can only speculate in these matters, it could be that 
the new Soviet “doctrine of conserving forces,”’ with its new ‘‘method”’ 
of the ‘‘fleet-in-being’’ for SSBNs, was prompted by some or all of 
the following developments: 
—the appearance in the Soviet operational inventory of the 
Delta-class SSBN equipped with the SS-N-8 SLBM, which has 
sufficient range to hit the United States from protected home 
waters; 
—Soviet development of the SS—N-13 missile; the retrofitting 
of some Yankee class tubes with these missiles would provide 
a formidable capability against surface ASW, assisting SSBNs in 
the initial ‘‘breakout”’ and promoting combat stability on the open 
ocean; 
—Soviet recognition of the lack of a real technological perspec- 
tive for combating SSBNs in the foreseeable future. 
THE QUESTION OF AUTHORITATIVENESS 
I have stated that, in my opinion, Gorshkov’s effort represented 
a “concrete expression of military doctrine.” Let me clarify what 
I mean by that and try to demonstrate its correctness. Soviet military 
doctrine is a difficult matter for specialists. As a nonspecialist, I shall 
simply report what the Russians themselves say on this head—having 
no reason to doubt that they mean what they say—and leave to 
others the task of higher criticism. 
THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MILITARY DOCTRINE 
The first thing to be noted is that Soviet military doctrine is a 
‘“‘military doctrine of the state,’’? the ‘‘result of a complex process 
of the development of state ideas in the sphere of resolving defense 
tasks and military development.” It is not, at least formally, a doctrine 
of the party, although it is stated to be in “‘complete accord’’ with 
party policy,? is actually worked out on the basis of “‘instructions” 
~~ 2Col. A. Babakov, “On the New Stage of Development of the USSR’s Armed Forces,” Krasnaya 
zvezda (hereafter referred to as KZ), May 8, 1964; Col. P. M. Derevyanko, ‘‘A Few Special Features 
of the Modern Revolution in Military Affairs,’ in P. M. Derevyanko (compiler), Problemy revolyutsii 
v voennom dele: sbornik statey (Moscow, 1965), 113. . 
3Gen.-Lt. I. Zav’yalov, ““The Creative Character of Soviet Military Doctrine,” KZ, Apr. 19, 1973, 
pe: 
