187 
While the defense councils and committees are also referred to 
as “higher organs of military leadership,’’’® this is not their specific 
designation; and they are definitely not to be confused with the other 
“higher organs of military leadership” at the level of the armed 
forces”® that have traditionally embodied the “‘strategic leadership of 
the armed forces.’’?! Whereas the ‘“‘military-policy organ” at the state 
level carries out “leadership of national defense and the armed 
forces,’ the subordinate strategic leadership at the level of the armed 
forces carries out ‘“‘direct leadership of the armed forces.’?? And 
whereas the military-political organs have consistently been designated 
as ‘defense’ councils or committees, the organs embodying the 
strategic leadership have always been designated as ‘‘military councils”’ 
or ““commands’’—the Higher Military Council of the Republic (1918), 
the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (1918-23), the 
Revolutionary Military Council of the U.S.S.R. (1923-34), the Military 
Council under (pri) the People’s Commissar of Defense (1934-38), 
the. Main Military Councils of the Red Army and Navy (1938-41), 
the Stavka of the Supreme High Command (1941-45),?3 the Higher 
Military Council attached (pri) to the People’s Commissariat 
(Ministry) of the Armed Forces (1946-50), and the Higher Military 
Council attached to the Council of Ministers (1950 at least to the 
early 1960’s). 
This latter council presumably either continues to exist under that 
name or it has been redesignated, perhaps as the “Main Military 
Council,” in existence as early as 1962.74 The composition of this 
Zakharov (ed.), 50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR, 198-199, 211, 477, 569; Sokolovskiy, op. cit., 
414-426. 
*°Col. Yu.P. Petrov, Partiynoe stroitel’stvo v Sovetskoy Armii i Flota (Moscow, 1964), 38, 287, 
339; Azovtsev, V. I. Lenin i Sovetskaya voennaya nauka, 128; N.F. Kuz’min, V. I. Lenin vo glave 
oborony Sovetskoy strany, 198-1920 gg. (Moscow, 1958), 99; Zakharov (ed.), 50 let Vooruzhennykh 
Sil SSSR, 52. 
*' Petrov, op. cit., 339; Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union G. |. Zhukov, “Military Com- 
manders Recall. . . ,° VIZ, No. 5, 1970, p. 52; Azovtsev, V. I. Lenin i Sovetskaya voennaya nauka, 
253, Shatagin and Prusanov, op. cit., 66; A. Grechko, “The Great Victory,’ VIZ, No. 5, 1970, p. 6; 
Sokolovskiy, op. cit., 404, 426-428, 431; V. Kulikov, “Soviet Military Art in the Years of the Great 
Patriotic War,” Kommunist, No. 4, 1975, p. 84, 85; P. Batitskiy, “The National Air Defense Troops,” 
VIZ, No. 4, 1975, p. 44; E. Maltsev, ““The CPSU—Inspirer and Organizer of the Soviet People’s Vic- 
tory in the Great Patriotic War,” ibid., 12; Zakharov (ed), 50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR, 267; 
Marshal of the Sovict Union I. Kh. Bagramyan, Gen. of the Army S. P. Ivanov el al (eds.), Istoriya 
voin 1 voennogo iskusstva (Moscow, 1970), 141, 401-402, 404; I. B. Berkhin, Voennaya reforma v 
SSSR, 1924-1925 gg (Moscow, 1958), 152; A. Epishev, *‘The Leninist Party—Organizer of Victory in 
the Great Patriotic War,’ Kommunist, No. 2, 1975, p. 72. 
2 Krasil ’nikov and Yakovlev, op. cit., 214. 
23 Actually, first the Stavka of the High Command of the Armed Forces (created June 23, 1941), 
then the Stavka of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (July 10, 1941) and only then the 
Stavka of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces (August 8, 1941). 
Col. Yu. P. Petrov, Stroitel’stvo politorganov, partiynikh i komsomol’skikh organizatsii Armii i 
Flota 1918-1968 (Moscow, 1968), 507; Col. Yu. I. Korablev in Zheltov (ed.), V. I. Lenin i Sovetskie 
Vooruzhennye Sily, 148. Some discussions have treated the Higher Defense Council as the successor 
of the Higher Military Council but this seems unlikely to me. There is, first, the matter of nomencla- 
ture—“‘defense” as against “military."’ Second, there is the matter of the composition of these coun- 
cils, which are at variance in the weighting of Party, state and military-professional representation. 
Third, there is the matter of the language used apparently in connection with the Higher Military 
Council on the occasion of Zhukov’s ouster in 1957. Zhukov, who was charged with wanting to 
“liquidate” the Higher Military Council, was said to have violated Leninist Party principles of 
“leadership of the armed forces.’ Throughout the entire Zhukov affair there are no references to the 
“political and military leadership of the state” or to the violation of principles of ‘Party leadership of 
national defense.” Zhukov wanted to liquidate Party control over “the Army and Navy,” not over 
“national defense,” over the “development of the armed forces,” not over “defense development” or 
“military development.” The indictment deals specifically with “the leadership of the armed forces,” 
which was involved with strengthening the ‘‘combat readiness,” “combat strength” and “combat 
capabilities of the armed forces.” See Petrov, Partiynoe stroitel’stvo v Sovetskoy Armii i Flote, 
460-463, 467; V. A. Zubarev and P. A. Sidoroy (editors-compilers), V pomoshch’ ofitseram, 
izuchayushchim marksistko-leninskuyu teoriyu: sbornik statey (Moscow, 1959), 4, 5, 12, 14, 18, 68, 
69, 109; Korablev and Loginov (eds.), op. cit., 27, 444. 
