193 
of ‘‘military-political measures,’’”! it would seem to follow that tasks 
in the “national oborona”’ are ‘‘military-political tasks,” which we 
know to have been historically assigned to the armed forces by the 
national political and military leadership,” in contrast to “‘military- 
strategic tasks’’ of the armed forces, assigned by the strategic leader- 
ship of the armed forces for the realization of military-strategic goals.” 
In other words, the armed forces have orientations in both systems 
and there even seem to be two different sets of ‘‘party principles” 
to govern these orientations—the principles of ‘‘leadership of the 
armed forces” and the principles of “‘military development.” The first 
set regulates the Party’s interaction with the military commands, in 
order to insure “‘their coordinated and effective accomplishment of 
tasks for the oborona of the motherland.’ The second set aims at 
perfecting the “‘internal’’ organization and development of the armed 
forces and their ‘‘combat and political training’ in accordance with 
the goals and missions of ‘‘wars in zashchita of the Socialist father- 
land.”’74 
The armed forces as a whole, and each of its branches, have con- 
sistently had tasks in both systems. In the interwar years the Red 
Army was said to have been transformed into a force “‘responsive 
to the tasks of Socialist state oborona and the requirements for waging 
war.”7> On the eve of the Soviet Army and Navy jubilee in 1967, 
a number of military and air defense districts were given awards 
‘for their great contribution to the cause of strengthening the defense 
(oboronnoe) might of the Soviet state and its armed zashchita.”” 
The strategic missile troops are considered “‘primary instruments for 
deterring an aggressor and decisively defeating him in war,”’ and 
presumably for this reason we have references to “‘the tasks of these 
troops in the general system of national oborona”’ and to their 
‘““combat”’ potential for fulfilling “‘the basic strategic tasks of nuclear- 
missile war.’’ As for the Air Force, the distinction is made between 
“its role and mission in the general system of socialist state oborona 
and its role and place in the Soviet Union’s armed forces.’*” With 
respect to the 1967 navy, the Central Committee had “‘defined its 
place in national oborona and indicated the path for developing a 
modern ocean-going nuclear-missile fleet, capable of accomplishing 
strategic tasks of an offensive character in modern war.” ”® 
™ Gen. of the Army V. Kulikov, “Strategic Leadership of the Armed Forces,” VIZ, No. 6, 1975, p. 
12; Grechko, Vooruzhennye Sily Sovetskogo gosudarstva, 64. 
7 Pospelov (ed.), op. cit., VI, 218, 221; Bagramyan, Ivanov et al. (eds.), op. cit., 401-402; Kulikov 
in VIZ, No. 6, 1975, p. 14. 
733 Col. A. Babakov, ‘“‘Leninist Principles of Military Development,’ KVS, No. 11, 1969, pp. 22-23. 
™ Sokolovskiy (ed.), Voennaya strategiya (3rd ed.), 272, 442. 
75 Gen.-Col. G. Sredin, ‘On Guard Over the Soviet Fatherland,” Partiynaya zhizn’, No. 4, 1974, p. 
18; Editorial, ‘Higher Vigilance and Combat Readiness,” Tyl i snabzhenie, No. 4, 1968, p. 2. 
7 Chief Air Marshal K. Vershinin, “The Mighty Air Force of the Sovict Power,” KVS, No. 12, 
1961, p. 21. 
7 Fleet Adm. V. Kasatonov, “On Combat Watch,” KZ, July 30, 1967, p. 1. For references in a 
naval context to the “system” or “‘combat system of the armed forces,” see Vice-Adm. N. 
Vinogradov, ‘Faithful Guardian of the Sea Frontiers of Soviet Power,” Izvestiya, July 23, 1950; 
Rear-Adm. M. Yakovenko, *‘Naval Forces of the Soviet Power,” Sovetskaya Litva, July 23, 1950; 
Adm. A. Golovko, ““The Mighty Navy of the Land of Socialism,” Izvestiya, July 29, 1951; Gorsh- 
kov,*Always on Combat Watch,” Pravda, July 31, 1966, Gorshkov’'s **Preface’’ to Rear-Adm. N. A. 
Piterskiy (ed.), Boevoy put’ Sovetskogo Voenno-morskogo Flota (Moscow, 1967), 11, Gorshkov in 
Voprosy filosofii, No. 5, 1975, pp. 26-27. , 
78 Gen. of the Army I. Shavrov, ““*The XXIV Congress of the CPSU and the Further Strengthening 
of National Defense Capabilities,’ KVS, No. 8, 1975, p. 17; “In the Central Committee of the 
CPSU,” KVS, No. 5, 1975, p. 4 and Kommunist, No. 3, 1975, p. 9; Col. V. Izmaylov, “The Nature 
and Special Features of Modern War,’ KVS, No. 6, 1975; p. 72; Col. M. Yasyukov, “Leninism—an 
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