200 
The Warsaw Pact illustrates the same systemic dualism. On the 
one hand the Pact, which is distinguished by ‘“‘unity in its political 
and military goals,” is a “military,” ‘political and military” or 
‘“‘military-political alliance of the European Socialist countries,” 
through which the “military policy of the U.S.S.R.” is coordinated 
with ‘‘defense (oboronnye) measures” of the other Socialist countries, 
each of whom has assumed important “political and military obliga- 
tions.”” Viewed from this perspective, the Pact aims at ‘deepening 
the military collaboration (or political and military collaboration) of 
the states of the Warsaw Pact” and at “‘strengthening allied national 
defense capabilities (oboronosposobnost’) and the fulfillment of obliga- 
tions for joint oborona.”” Viewed from the perspective of the system 
of the armed forces, on the other hand, the Pact is considered to 
be a “‘combat alliance” with a ‘‘military-strategic foundation,” aimed 
at “‘strengthening the combat collaboration of the Warsaw Pact ar- 
mies” and serving the goal of ‘“‘joint zashchita.’’7? As one writer puts 
it, “the common tasks for zashchita of the socialist camp against 
attacks by the imperialist aggressors presuppose not only the combat 
collaboration of the armies of the socialist countries but also a unity 
of strategic views.” °° 
Pact exercises and maneuvers also serve a dual purpose. They have 
a “great military-political significance,’ both in demonstrating the 
‘““growing defense (oboronnaya) strength of the Socialist states” and 
in cementing the unity of the Socialist countries. At the same time 
these exercises perfect the skills of military personnel and “enrich 
the theory of military art of the Socialist armies.’ *? 
While the armed forces have tasks in both systems, the main orienta- 
tion has traditionally been within the combat system of the armed 
forces. Whereas the nation (strana), that is, the state, does not, 
properly speaking, undergo preparations for zashchita, the armed 
forces do not undergo preparations for oborona—hence the common 
formula, expressed by Marshal Grechko as “‘the preparation of the 
nation for oborona and (the preparation) of its armed zashchita.”® 
The Soviets never tire of telling us that “the armed forces are 
an instrument for waging war,’’** and all of the U.S.S.R.’s wars are 
fought in the name of national zashchita. The armed forces are created 
for national zashchita; they undergo training or preparation 
(podgotovka) for national zashchita; having been trained, they are 
prepared or ready (gotovyy) or exist in a state of preparedness or 
readiness (gotovnost’) for national zashchita; and when war becomes 
a fact, the troops engage in “‘armed state zashchita,” in the “military 
zashchita of the U.S.S.R.”’ Today there are apparently no such things 
as armed struggles in the national oborona. And as far as I can 
(Continued) 
Ideological Weapon of the CPSU,” KVS, No. 7, 1975, p. 17; Col. I. Igoshev, “The World Socialist 
System—Today’s Decisive Force,’ KVS, No. 10, 1975, pp. 76-77; Sushko and Kondratkov, op. cit., 
289; Grechko, Vooruzhennye Sily Sovetskogo gosudarstva, 391, 392; Gen. of the Army P. Batov, 
“Combat Alliance of the Fraternal Peoples,” KZ, May 14, 1964; Col. A. A. Babakov in Zheltov 
(ed.), V. I. Lenin i Sovetskie Vooruzhennye Sily, 132; Capt. Ist Rank P. Zvantsev, “In a Unitive 
System,” MS, No. 3, 1975, p. 26. 
79 Sokolovskiy (ed.), Voennaya strategiya (3rd ed.), 37. 
®° Grechko in Kommunist, No. 4, 1971, p. 96; Zvantsev, op. cit., 28. 
81 Grechko, Vooruzhennye Sily Sovetskogo gosudarstva, 81. 
82 Grechko speech of July 1968 in Chernenko and Savinkin (compilers), op. cit., 457; Sushko and 
Kondratkov, op. cit., 274. 
831 have treated the controversial subject of Soviet usage of zaschita strany at some length in a 
forthcoming paper, tentatively entitled Military-Political and Military-Strategic Leadership in the 
(Continued) 
