202 
the success of the retaliatory nuclear-missile strike, in combina- 
tion with active operations by all branches of the armed forces, 
must insure the achievement of the strategic goals of the war 
and the nature of the solution to the basic military-political tasks 
in, the, future o.s5e 
Thus, it’s not that Gorshkov was in error in pointing up the navy’s 
usefulness in achieving the ‘“‘political goals of the armed struggle in 
war;” all wars have political goals. It’s only that Gorshkov left out 
an intermediate link that traditionally has been in the chain—the 
fact that ‘“‘the military potential of each country is realized by policy 
through military strategy,’’°? which must be accorded its due in discus- 
sion. This is just as true of nuclear strike forces as of other forces, 
even though they affect ‘‘the sphere of strategy that is most directly 
connected with policy.’’* In all examples I have collected, if there 
is a reference to political goals, there is a simultaneous reference 
to strategic tasks or goals or to the attainment of political goals 
through strategy or instruments of strategy. Indeed, Soviet usage shows 
that it is not always necessary to mention political goals and, in 
fact, it is the more common practice to discuss only strategic tasks 
or goals, the political objectives being understood. Gorshkov, however, 
leaves out what seems to be required and leaves in the dispensa- 
ble—and we wonder why. 
EVOLUTION OF THE NAVY’S NATIONAL DEFENSE TASK 
Gorshkov and other naval spokesmen have not always left out “the 
required,” nor had they previously identified ‘“‘national oborona against 
possible attacks from ocean axes” as the navy’s “‘main task.” True, 
the navy, like all the other branches of the armed forces, has always 
been thought of as important ‘“‘in the general system of national 
oborona,®?! but when Lenin decreed the existence of the Red Navy 
in 1918, it was because he “attached great significance to national 
zashchita from the sea.”’*? On Navy Day 1963 the navy’s senior politi- 
cal officer explained that the holiday ‘constitutes national recognition 
of the important role and great merit of the navy in zashchita of 
the world’s first socialist state and in strengthening its oborono-capa- 
bilities.’ *? At this time the navy had only some 100 SLBM’s, all 
of relatively short range;°* as a consequence, it was apparently not 
given a true strategic-strike mission. To use the terminology introduced 
later, within the system of the armed forces the navy was basically 
oriented on ‘‘combatting the enemy fleet,’ rather than conducting 
‘“‘operations against the shore.”’ That is, it was said to have “everything 
necessary, not only for defending our shores, foiling the aggressor’s 
attacks from the sea and neutralizing the strike groupings of his forces, 
but also for offensive operations dealing crushing strikes on the aggres- 
sor’s navy and its bases in remote regions of the oceans.” ® 
88V_M. Kulish in Kulish, Solodovnik et al., op. cit., 26. 
89 Lt.-Col. V. G. Kozlov in Zheltov, Kondratkov and Khomenko (eds.), op. cit., 71. 
%° Adm. V. A. Kasatonov, ‘“‘Thirty Glorious Years,’ KZ, July 27, 1963. 
*! Vice-Adm. G. M. Egorov, ‘“‘Always on Combat Watch,” Sovetskaya Rossiya, July 30, 1967, p. 3. 
®2 Grishanov, “‘Guardian of our Sea Frontiers,"’ Izvestiya, July 28, 1963. 
%3 Walter D. Jacobs, “Soviet Strategic Effectiveness,” Journal of International Affairs, XX VI, No. 1, 
1972, p. 65. 
*4 Gorshkov, ‘‘A Short-Sighted Strategy,’’ Izvestiya, May 19, 1963, p. 3. 
%5 Jacobs, op. cit., 66. 
