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renunciation of operations against the shore on the condition that 
one’s opponent practices the same restraint, “deterrence” as a role 
‘in peacetime’’ and as a “role in modern war,” but deterrence also 
as a method of peacetime and intrawar bargaining and for ensuring 
a favorable ‘‘political’’ solution to the armed struggle. To ensure the 
viability of the wartime deterrent, the SSBN must be protected, the 
resources for which may be partially or entirely drawn from the mis- 
sion of combating the enemy fleet; hence its downgrading. However, 
Gorshkov seems to be saying that this involves no substantial loss, 
due to the ‘‘great survivability’ of the SSBN, Western as well as 
Soviet, and to the poor showing of ASW against modern nuclear 
submarines. 
At any rate, this is the hypothesis to be tested. Although a ‘“‘main 
task,” we do not know how many SLBMs are to be withheld. It 
seems unlikely that all would be withheld. Presumably the decision 
to withhold was partially triggered by the imminent deployment of 
the D-class SSBN with the SS—N-8 and therefore perhaps only these 
missiles will constitute the military-political reserve. This would ac- 
count for the enhanced importance of the navy in the system of 
national oborona, but since these are additional missiles, not real- 
located ones, it does not account for the seemingly reduced im- 
portance of the navy as an instrument of strategy. I am not fully 
persuaded that this reduced strategic importance can be attributed 
entirely to the apparent downgrading of the navy’s antiSSBN mission 
(‘combating the enemy fleet’). The question then arises: was the 
withholding decision also linked to the imminent deployment of the 
SS-N-13 missile, which has a capability against surface ships at sea? 
If the Soviets wanted to hold back a portion of their Y-class boats, 
then a part of the Yankee SLBM inventory could be replaced with 
SS-N-13 missiles, giving a capability against surface ASW forces. 
This would support the initial ‘breakout’? from home waters and 
greater ‘‘combat stability” on the open oceans.''? I have nothing 
concrete to go on here; it only seems a reasonable hypothesis. 
"97 am indebted to N. B. Dismukes for this suggested solution. 
