214 
The formal unification, centralization, and coordination of pol- 
icymaking in the Soviet Union would indicate a unified decisionmaking 
center for most policy issues. The Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (hereafter, CPSU) is the sole political party, and pluralism 
is not allowed. The basic principle of CPSU organization is democratic 
centralism. The party seeks strict discipline and the decisions of higher 
bodies are obligatory for lower bodies. It claims to be the authoritative 
source of values and the oracle of the one correct ideology which 
is imposed on citizens through education and indoctrination. The 
party’s role in leadership (rukovodstvo) and guidance (napravlenie) 
is often emphasized. The party is also to supervise, expedite and 
mediate, work in personnel selection and education, propaganda and 
morale building. 
The actual powers of the CPSU are more limited than its formal 
structure indicates. The difficulties in planning and managing a com- 
plex economy and society are witnessed both by the criticism and 
self-criticism of administrators in the Soviet Union, and the constant 
reorganizations and attempts to improve the system. The Soviet Union 
has a GNP of $660 billion, a little more than half that of the United 
States. Coordinating and directing an economy of this size, with 
200,000 enterprises of ‘‘census size’? and about 20 million distinct 
products is an enormous task.’ Centralized policy planning is inevitably 
difficult when a multitude of considerations and interests must be 
taken into account. The process is further encumbered when external 
political and economic forces must be evaluated. 
Disagreements on management and policy issues extend throughout 
the CPSU and have been documented in a number of cases, even 
among the top leadership.* Politics, by nature involves conflict and 
party members do not necessarily share a single view on policy 
problems. The ideologically appealing monopoly centralization con- 
tradicts the requirements of a modern industrial state facing complex 
and difficult decisions that bring expert opinion and interest groups 
into play. In addition to the diversity within the Communist Party 
and outside interests, the varied Soviet government bureaucracy exerts 
policy influence. Soviet ministries are a source of technical expertise 
and information, and have considerable powers in their sectors over 
the formulation and implementation of decisions. 
Although the Communist Party may have the main role in defining 
policy and determining directions of development, the government 
®U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee. Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and 
China. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, 94th Cong., Ist 
sess., April 1974, p. 5. 
7 Abram Bergson, ‘‘Planning and Productivity Under Soviet Socialism” (New York: Carnegie Mel- 
lon University, 1968), p. 67. 
*Slusser, in his study of the 1961 Berlin crisis found ‘tevidence of a power struggle more intense, 
more violent and more divisive than had previously been suspected” and which resulted in the glaring 
inconsistencies and sudden policy shifts. Robert Slusser, ““The Berlin Crisis of 1961” (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. ix. On policy and power struggles, see, also Robert 
Conquest, “After the Fall: Some Lessons,’ Problems of Communism, 14 (Jan./Feb. 1965): 17-22, S. 
Dinerstein, ‘‘War and the Soviet Union” (N.Y.: Praeger, 1962); Wolfgang Leonhard, “The Kremlin 
Since Stalin’ (New York: Praeger, 1962); Carl A. Linden, ‘“‘Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 
1957-1964" (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966); Michel Tatu, ‘‘Power in the Krem- 
lin’, trans. Helen Katel (New York: Viking Press, 1969). 
