218 
mittee Plenum, and Party Congress following in importance. The in- 
volvement of these bodies in ocean policymaking and ocean issues 
is difficult to determine because of the lack of discussion and data. 
Ocean interests and possible approaches to the ocean decisionmaking 
process can be inferred, however, on the basis of various studies 
conducted on other issue areas, and by using the scant data that 
is available on ocean policy formulation. 
The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the 
Politburo, is an elusive organization and its precise relationship to 
ocean policymaking is uncertain. It is known that the Politburo deals 
with a wide range of foreign and domestic policy matters and that 
technical considerations play an important role because of the party’s 
overview of economic and social planning. The Politburo has taken 
action on major economic goals and foreign policy issues.” It also, 
on occasion, intervenes in basic management and production tasks.’® 
Our information does not indicate what type of issues are subject 
to detailed discussions, or at what stage they are considered. It can 
be speculated that ocean policy formulation will not be a matter 
of continual Politburo review, but will occasionally arise as a major 
issue or as part of broader foreign policy considerations. 
In describing Politburo functions, it should be kept in mind that 
there have been many and extreme changes in its exercise of power 
over the years of Soviet rule. Stalin centralized and embodied Soviet 
policymaking. Beginning in 1934, he conducted a bloody coup against 
the CPSU and deliberately emasculated and compartmentalized the 
Politburo and assumed the right to make decisions.’ Although 
Khrushchev also took a great deal of personal initiative on both major 
and mundane matters, the Politburo revived after Stalin’s death. The 
Politburo (then called Presidium) acted in a more collegial manner 
and Khrushchev’s power varied over time, depending on the strength. 
of his opposition and the flexibility of the administrative structure. 
Khrushchev stated in an interview that the Politburo met weekly to 
discuss matters. Sometimes the discussions became very heated, and) 
a vote would be taken on issues if unanimity could not be reached.** — 
Under Brezhnev, the Politburo system is one of fuller collegial 
responsibilities. Its fifteen voting and seven consultative or candidate 
'S There is a long list of examples, such as the virgin lands program, Khrushchev’s promotion of the 
chemical industry, and SALT. On this last issue see Raymond L. Garthoff, “‘“SALT and the Soviet, 
'‘Military,” Problems of Communist 24 (January/February 1975). Garthoff states that the Politburo 
‘made the key decisions to enter SALT and determined all major Soviet positions. During the inten-, 
sive negotiations on SALT in May 1972, the Politburo met at least four times during 5 days, p. 29. 
®Q. K. Antonov writes ‘“‘Have you noticed that the Party has several times rolled up its sleeves, 
gone after one industry or another, and, dragging it out of the morass of gradualism, given it a 
powerful push in a direction that the country required?”’ In ‘“‘Why does it take a fight to modernize 
output?”’ Znamiya (February 1957) pp. 148-162. Trans. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 9 (16, 
1957). Cited by Arthur J. Alexander, ‘‘R and D in Soviet Aviation’ (Santa Monica, California: The 
Rand Corporation, 1970) R-589-PR, p. 27. Also, Khrushchev at one point said that “‘we” 
(presumably the Politburo) would be able to “shake” Smirnov, the new head of the State Committee 
for Defense Technology “*. . . just as we used to shake Comrad Ustinov, who used to answer for the 
development of the defense industry.”’ Pravda, 26 April 1973. Quoted by Werner G. Hahn, “The 
Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960-1970,” (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 
110. 
17See ‘“‘Khrushchev’s Secret Speech (as released by the U.S. Department of State on June 4, 1956) 
in “‘Khrushchev Remembers,” translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (New York: Bantam Books, 
Inc., 1970), pp. 672-673. Alexander Barmine also presents an account of Politburo work where there 
was only a veneer of collective activity and Stalin made decisions in the form of “proposals.” In 
“One Who Survived” (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1945), pp. 212-228. 
18 Pravda, cited by Gilison, pp. 147-148. 
