; 220 
The operating procedures of the Politburo remain an unanswered 
question. According to an interview with Brezhnev, the Politburo 
meets once a week with sessions lasting from 3 to 6 hours. Decisions 
are reached by consensus, but if there is disagreement, a special 
committee is set up to study the issue.” Heads of departments can 
be invited to attend sessions by special invitation when policy 
questions under discussion concern them,”? and ocean experts are 
probably invited when domestic or foreign maritime policy is con- 
sidered. Many Western analysts see the Politburo operating under 
consensual compromises in an effort to avoid direct conflict and 
preserve a balance between members. 
There is no description as to how issues are selected for discussion 
or on what basis decisions are made. Institutional procedures must 
be available for distinguishing between greater and lesser problems. 
Because of the limited personal staffs of the Politburo members and 
the potentially broad range of issues to be considered, many analysts 
have speculated that the Secretariat of the Central Committee is cru- 
cial in the screening and coordinating process. It is also thought that 
individual Politburo members have the prerogative of initiating discus- 
sion of issues. 
The problem of complex issues also has an impact on the decision- 
making process. There are indications in the literature that ad hoc 
committees and commissions are widely used, and Brezhnev mentions 
the use of temporary committees when unanimous decisions cannot 
be reached.?4 Commissions can also be set up in the Central Commit- 
tee to study questions and prepare recommendations.” Outside experts 
from the ministries and other agencies probably participate in this 
process. 
There is little information on ocean policy formulation in Politburo 
sessions. Since ocean issues have involved important international and 
resource allocation problems, one can assume that as they become 
crucial they will be included in Politburo considerations. Maritime 
uses are also a part of broader foreign relations, as is apparent in 
the case of fisheries and Soviet relations with Japan, Cuba, Canada, 
or the United States, policies for naval expansion, and technical 
assistance programs and aid in maritime uses to third world countries. 
It can be speculated that ocean policy consideration in the Politburo 
occasionally takes place in the context of broader foreign policy issues. 
The only public example of Politburo action in the field of ocean 
policymaking is the dismissal of the head of the navy, Admiral Kuznet- 
sov, in 1955.26 Stalin sought a powerful, balanced navy and in 1950 
22 Theodore Shabad, “Brezhnev, Who Ought to Know, Explains Politburo,” New York Times, June 
M3 Gate p. 29. 
*4 Shabad. 
25 Abdurakhaman Avtorkhanov, ‘“‘The Communist Party Apparatus’’ (Chicago: Henery Regnery 
Co., 1966), p. 216. It is also felt that in the absence of specially sctup committees, the government 
ministries and other subordinate bodies would receive extensive powers by default. Matthew P. Gal- 
lagher and Karl F. Spielmann Jr., “Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspec- 
tives on the Arms Race” (New York: Praeger, 1972), esp. pp. 28, 77, 86. 
26 This is described in more detail in “‘Khrushchev Remembers, The Last Testament,” trans. and ed. 
Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974) pp. 19-28; Robert Waring Herrick, “Soviet 
Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice’ (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1960) 
pp. 65-70. Michael MccGwire discusses ‘this and other changes in tne naval building program in 
‘Developments in Soviet Naval Policy: 1955-1973” (Paper, April 1973) and “The Turning Points in 
Naval Policy Formation,” in Michael K. MccGwire, ed., ‘‘Soviet Naval. Developments: Capability and 
Context”? (New York: Praeger, 1973). 
